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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will investigate the feasibility of developing nations’ ability to create a 
wholly indigenous advanced arms industry in the twenty-first century using China and 
India as case studies.  I propose it is not possible for developing nations in the current 
context of the globalized arms race to build an advanced arms industry because of the 
high political and economic costs.  Diverse competing interests force politicians to make 
decisions about distribution and usage of resources that will maintain their legitimacy.  
The hypothesis does not rule out that some domestic advancements may be made in 
certain sectors, such as nuclear bombs and missiles, because resources may be spent on 
narrowly defined goals instead of the development of the whole industry.  Nor does it 
rule out that a developing nation cannot have a modern military with advanced weaponry, 
just that the weapons will not all be wholly domestic.  They will obtain advanced 
weapons through joint development, purchasing, or licensing.  Political and economic 
cost will explain the failure of a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry to fully 
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The purpose of the thesis is to investigate the feasibility of developing nations’ 
abilities to create wholly indigenous advanced arms industries in the twenty-first century 
using China and India as case studies.  If any two developing countries have the 
capabilities to develop wholly indigenous arms industries, they are China and India 
because of their enormous economic gains in the past two decades.  Yet, I propose it is 
not possible for developing nations in the current context of the globalized arms race to 
build an advanced arms industry because of the high political and economic costs.  The 
hypothesis does not rule out that some domestic advancements may be made in certain 
sectors because resources may be spent on narrowly defined goals instead of the 
development of the whole industry.  Nor does it rule out that a developing nation cannot 
have a modern military with advanced weaponry, just that the weapons will not all be 
domestically developed.  Obtaining advanced weapons through joint development, 
purchasing, or licensing will be the model of procurement.  For China and India, political 
and economic cost will explain the failure of a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry 
to fully develop. 
Increasingly, when discussing rising powers, India and China are mentioned in 
the same breath.1  In recent years, they have illustrated their capacity to become world 
powers economically and militarily within the current century.  Thus, the potential 
growth in their domestic military production capabilities is important.  There is also on 
increasing amount of literature on the rise of China and India and what its relevance to 
the United States is.  Mainly, the discussion in mainstream media is concerned with their 
rising economic power.2  However, they are also both rising military powers in the global 
context and determined to modernize their military to be technologically relevant in 
today’s high-tech world.     
                                                 
1 Peter Wonacott, “India, China Forge Ties, But Old Differences Fester By,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 22, 2006, 6.  
2 Business Week, “China and India,” August 22-29, 2005, 49-136.; Michael Elliot, “India Awakens,” 
Time June 26, 2006, 36-39.; Fareed Zakaria, “India Rising,” Newsweek March 6, 2006, 32-42.; The 
Economist, “Can India Fly?” 379, no. 8480 (2006): 3-18. 
2 
China and India are very different countries politically, yet they share a similar 
pattern in historic and economic experiences of development.  China and India were 
ravaged by imperialism in the 19th century, adopted planned socialist-style economies in 
the post-war period, and continue to be the world’s first and second most populated 
countries with high rates of poverty and a wide gap between the rich and poor.   
However, politically both have taken different paths.  One is the world’s largest 
democracy and the other remains a communist country.  Whereas India gained 
independence through a civil disobedience movement and became a democracy, China 
fought a civil war and became a communist state in 1949.  Economically, they both have 
followed a similar path. In the process of achieving self-reliance, both have tried to 
develop an advanced arms industry to produce indigenous advanced weapons and both 
have, for the most part, failed.  While India has had a closer relation with the West’s arms 
industry than China, the greatest foreign influence on both their defense industries is that 
of the Soviet Union.  This influence has both hindered and helped the development of 
their domestic arms industry.  A comparative study of similarities and differences 
between China and India will help outline what inhibits the creation of fully native 
advanced arms industries in a developing nation.   
A. IMPORTANCE OF STUDY 
The importance of the research is to provide new insight into the discussion of 
India’s and China’s defense industry, as well as that of other developing nations.  Though 
once lively, the debate on India’s arms industry had nearly dried up over the previous 
decades.  With the rise of India as economic power, however, the subject on India is 
reemerging.  China, on the other hand, has always generated a lot of literature because of 
the perceived threat it poses to the security interests of the United States.   
Why is it then that two states that can develop nuclear weapons have failed in 
their quest to create a wholly indigenous advanced arms indigenous in the past 50 years?  
The thesis will explore if they face similar systemic problems that prevent the 
development of a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry.  This exploration will 
further our understanding of what to expect from future developing nations that may 
become economic giants.  Was it lack of resources, dependency on foreign power, or lack 
of accountability in the government bureaucracy that has failed these two countries?  The 
3 
answer is “yes” to all of the above, but the responsibility in the failure of each factor 
above is not equal.  I will argue the common theme to focus upon is the political will to 
use scarce resources for advancement of arms.   
In most political settings, diverse competing interests force politicians to make 
decisions about distribution and usage of resources that will keep them in power.  The 
greater the political capital, the greater the attention and resources an interest group will 
receive.  The political capital of different sectors does not remain static but changes over 
time.  It is not politically feasible for leaders in developing countries to pour all of the 
nation’s limited resources into an advanced arms industry alone and neglect other sectors 
that demand these same resources.  I view China’s Third Front as such an attempt.  
Neglecting other areas of the economy and society can lead to political instability, a 
failed state, or revolution.  I propose, for these reasons, it is not possible for developing 
nations after World War II to build a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry.   
One may argue that as countries such as India and China become richer and more 
technically savvy, they will be able to build up their industry and produce their own fully 
domestic arms industry over the next 50 years.  However, I contend that given the 
advancements that have already taken place in the arms sector, it is too late for late 
comers to develop their own wholly indigenous industry.  The combination of the 
revolution in military affairs (RMA), the end of the Cold War, the increase in 
globalization, the sheer cost of advanced weapons, and the high speed of technological 
changes has made it nearly impossible for countries in the world to develop advances in 
weapons alone.3  Although rising as economic powers, China and India will not be able 
to create a fully indigenous advanced arms industry for these reasons.  Joint development 
will be the only affordable alternative politically and economically.  Globally, defense 
industries are shrinking and consolidating due to the end of the Cold War, and states that 
once had the capability to produce their own such weapons are now pursuing joint 
development due to the high cost of today’s advanced weapon systems.4     
                                                 
3 Anil R. Pustam, “Gradual Evolution: China and India’s Indigenous Combat Aircraft Programmes 
Steadily Advance,” Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter 32, no. 1 (2006): 28-30.  
4 Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Post-2000 delays to China’s Arms Goals,” 29, no. 3 (1998): 22. 
4 
The joint development of the F-35 Joint Strike fighter between the United States 
(2003 defense budget $304.7 billion5) and, primarily, the United Kingdom (2003 defense 
budget $37.3 billion6) is an example that illustrates the high-cost concerns that face even 
rich countries such as the United States.  The F-35, still in development, has an estimated 
development cost of $35 billion.7  The United States’ F-22 Raptor’s developmental cost 
is $40 billion as of 2004.8  Britain is contributing at Level 1, or 10 percent, of the 
development costs of F-35s.  Italy and the Netherlands are considered Level 2 partners 
with the United States, contributing 5 percent of the development cost.  Level 3 partners 
Denmark, Norway, Canada, Australia, and Turkey, are contributing 1 to 2 percent of the 
cost. To put the cost in perspective for a developing nation, India’s entire defense budget 
in 2005 was $22.1 billion or 2.77 percent of their GDP.  Of that, the Indian Air Force 
received $5 billion with only $2.7 billion going to procurement.9  If India had the 
technical ability, it would take its entire procurement budget for 14 years to develop the 
F-22, by which time the F-22 would be nearly obsolete.  These facts support my assertion 
that the development of advanced fifth-generation weapons is at a point where developed 
nations cannot design and field advanced weapons on their own.  This will be especially 
true for the developing nations not possessing the research and development and 
manufacturing infrastructure developed nations enjoy. 
With help, India and China have made strides in modernizing their militaries.  
However, neither has been successful in developing a full range of indigenous advanced 
weapons system.  India has a mix of Western and Soviet/Russian aircraft and has licensed 
production of both.  China has licensed production of Soviet/Russian aircraft, and there is 
no argument that China’s indigenous armaments are, in effect, upgraded copies of 1950s’ 
                                                 
5 K. Crane, R. Cliff, E. Medeiros, J. Mulvenon, and W. Overholt, “Modernizing China’s Military 
Opportunities and Constraints,” RAND Project Air Force (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation 2005), 
228, www.rand.org (accessed November 7, 2006) 
6 Ibid. 
7 Jane’s Online Research, “Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.” http://www8.janes.com/ 
(accessed November 21, 2006) 
8 Jane’s Online Research, “Lockheed Martin (645) F-22 Raptor.” http://www8.janes.com/ (accessed 
November 21, 2006) 
9 Jane’s Online Research, “India Defence Spending.” http://www8.janes.com/ (accessed November 25, 
2006) 
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and 1960s’ Soviet equipment.10  Medeiros writes, “While many new types of [advanced 
weapons] … have entered service since 1980, for the most part the designs of these new 
systems have been incremental improvements on earlier designs, which in many cases 
trace their lineage back to 1950s’ Soviet technology.”11  Yet there is only so much one 
can modernize an obsolete weapons system.  As this study will show, the weapons that 
are partially domestic in both countries, particularly China, still require a great deal of 
outside help for the more technical aspects of development. 12  Although I argue India is 
further along than China in developing an indigenous capability, the advanced arms 
industry has reached the point where it is so expensive that China and India can no longer 
develop a wholly domestic advanced arms industry.  Therefore, joint development will be 
the only path for them to modernize their defense industry, which they are already 
pursuing in some sectors.   
Not having the ability to produce a fully advanced arms industry and seeking the 
most advanced weapons; both India and China will pursue joint development, but they 
will take different paths.  I envision India will pursue more joint development with the 
West and the United States instead of Russia.  Though Russia is their traditional partner, 
India has always preferred Western hardware due to the capabilities.  Joint ventures with 
the West will help modernize its arms industry at a faster rate because Western nations 
are more likely to accept partners for joint development programs.13  As a communist 
state, China will travel a more difficult road.  In comparison, India’s production 
capabilities are more technically advanced than China’s although they spend less.  
Western countries will hesitate in doing joint ventures with China’s authoritarian regime.  
                                                 
10 Paul H. B. Godwin, “The PLA faces the Twenty-First Century: Reflections on Technology, 
Doctrine, Strategy, and Operations,” in China’s Military Faces the Future, ed. James Lilley and David 
Shambaugh (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999): 63.;  John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “China’s Search for a 
Modern Air Force,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 64-94.; Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. 
Pollack, eds. Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan. (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1980)  
11 E. Medeiros, R. Cliff, K. Crane, and J. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, 
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2005) 8-9. www.rand.org (accessed November 7, 2006)  
12 Crane, “Modernizing,” 246.; Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, “Advanced Military 
Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century,” in the Chinese Armed Forces in 
the 21st Century, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 
1999): 194. 
13 Richard Bitzinger, “The Globalization of the Arms Industry: The Next Proliferation Challenge,” 
International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 178. 
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The Russians are, and will continue to be, the largest supplier of weapons and weapons 
technology to China.  However, even though China’s system of government may impede 
Western nations from working to get a piece of the China market, it will not stop them 
from selling weapons or components, as demonstrated by Israel, Britain, and other 
European-Union countries.  
Investigating the feasibility of India and China developing an advanced arms 
industry will provide some important insight into the future of their defense industries as 
well as those of the rest of the developing world.  My research will demonstrate that 
nations without a fully indigenous arms industry will not be able to acquire one, even 
through licensing/building other countries’ weapons or through joint development.  If 
they continue down the road alone in an attempt to develop a fully native defense 
production capability, they will fail ending up with expensive obsolete weapons systems.  
If they continue to license and build upon other countries’ weapons, they will not fully 
develop their own industry, nor will they have cutting-edge weapons. In addition, they 
remain dependent on or vulnerable to foreign powers.  The path less-developed nations 
will choose and with whom they will pursue development will also have ramifications on 
the United States’ influence in the region, the international community, and balance of 
power in the region.   
B LITERATURE REVIEW 
One of China’s and India’s goals since becoming modern nation-states was self-
reliance in the arms industry.  Both the nations have worked to create an advanced arms 
industry, yet their success is limited to their missile and nuclear programs.  At first 
glance, it would seem that two countries that have developed nuclear powers would also 
have the capability of developing indigenous advanced arms industry.  The predominant 
opinion, however, is that the defense industry in India and China is producing modern 
7 
advanced weaponry in certain sectors only.14  The defense industries in both countries are 
mostly nationalized and, therefore, heavily influenced by domestic politics.  Changes in 
government, security environment, and the economy are all important factors that 
determine the kind of support the arms industry receives.  These factors influence the 
leadership’s capacity to use the nation’s limited resources on the defense sector. Both 
India’s and China’s arms industry has ridden the rollercoaster of politics, becoming a 
priority in times of a perceived threat and taking a back seat when the threat decreases.  
The problem facing both the countries is that at times of threat, when the defense sector is 
expected to perform, past indifferences and poor funding hamper their ability to perform 
and produce. 
1. Indian Advanced Arms: A Preview 
In the case of India, most research addresses the failings or successes of the 
weapons systems themselves and devotes little or no attention to the structural reasons for 
the industry’s failures or successes.  Very few scholars have attempted an in-depth 
analysis of India’s industry wide domestic production and procurement problems.15  The 
bulk of literature focuses on individual projects undertaken by the Indian arms industry, 
focusing on what has succeeded and what has failed.16  A number of distinct camps stand 
out.  One camp blames India’s failure to develop its own weapons capacity on the 
dependency on Soviet Union.17  Others, such as Deba Mohanty, blame the lack of 
                                                 
14 Adrienne K. Darling, India Global Ambitions Limited By Reach (Strategy Research Project, United 
States Army War College, 1998); June T. Dreyer, The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict, (Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000); Paul H.B. Godwin, “From Continent to 
Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities towards 2000,” China Quarterly 146, Special Issue: 
China's Military in Transition, (1996): 464-487.; Amit Gupta, “Determining India's Force Structure and 
Military Doctrine: I Want My MiG,” Asian Survey 35, no. 5 (1995): 441-458.; A. Z. Hilali, “India's 
Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy,” Asian Survey 41, no. 5 (2001): 737-764.; Ellis Joffe, 
The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987); David Shambaugh, 
“China Engages Asia, Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 6 (2004): 64-99. and 
Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (Berkeley CA: University of California 
Press, 2002)  
15 Amit Gupta, “The Indian Arms Industry: A Lumbering Giant?” Asian Survey 30, no. 9 (1990): 846-
861.; Chris Smith, India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford; NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1994) 
16 Coniglio Sergio and Mohammed Ahmedullah, “Indian Air Force Ponders New Fighter 
Programme,” Military Technology 29, no. 2 (2005): 85.; James Clad, “India: Industry,” Far Eastern 
Economic Review 148, no. 23 (1990): 47-48. 
17 Gupta, “Lumbering,” 846-861.; Ramesh Thakur, “The Impact of the Soviet Collapse on Military 
Relations With India,” Europe-Asia Studies 45, no. 5 (1993): 831-850. 
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sufficient funding and access to modern defense technologies.18  Still others blame the 
military’s indecision and changing requirements.19  However, none focus on whether it 
was possible to develop the industry given the domestic and political constraints in the 
country and the rapid technological advancements in the world.   
2. China’s Advanced Arms Development  
The literature on China differs from the Indian literature in one very important 
aspect and that is what its arms advancement means for the United States.  There are two 
debates concerning the rise of China as a military power.  The first debate in the literature 
is whether China is a threat to the United States or not.20  In addition to the rising threat 
literature, there is also a debate about whether China’s military is catching up 
technologically with the United States military capabilities, which appears to be 
contradictory given China’s inability to modernize its military.  Like the threat debate, 
there is no consensus on China’s defense development and modernization.  Some say 
China can modernize its military.21  Others say it is impossible to predict more than 10 to 
15 years down the road, and the possibility of modernization should not be dismissed 
outright, as we should not underestimate China.22  There seems to be a greater number 
who feel that China is not going to catch up with the United States anytime soon with 
                                                 
18 Deba R. Mohanty, “India's Defence Budget Blinkers,” Military Technology 29, no. 4 (2005): 6. and 
“The Long March Toward Self-Reliance,” Military Technology 27, no. 2 (2003): 35-42. 
19 Smith, Ad Hoc.; Mrinal Suman, “Qualitative Requirements of Military Equipment Need For a 
Process Revamp,” Bharat Rakshak, The Consortium of Indian Military Websites. http://www.bharat-
rakshak.com/SRR/Vol12/suman.html (accessed August 2006) 
20 Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up, China’s Rise and Challenges for 
U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no 4 (2001): 5-40.;  Dreyer, PLA. Aaron L. Friedberg, 
“The Struggle for Mastery in Asia,” Commentary Nov. 2000, 17-26.; Jane’s Intelligent Review, “Pentagon 
Raises eyebrow at China’s Military Rise,” 18, no 8 (2006): 50-51.; Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon, 
“China’s Hollow Military,” The National Interest, no. 53 (1999): 55-62.; John G. Ikenberry, “American 
Hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 3 (2004): 353-367.; 
Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs, Nov. - Dec 2003, 22-
35. 
21 Johnathan D. Pollack, “China as a Military Power,” in Military Power and Policy in Asian States: 
China, India, Japan, ed. Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 
43-100.  
22 Michael Pillsbury, “PLA Capabilities in the 21st Century: How does China Assess Its Future 
Security Needs?” in The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999), 89-158. 
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their domestic capabilities and modernization.23  It is the last school of thought that 
supports my thesis.  China will not be able to develop a fully indigenous arms capability.   
Meanwhile, literature that comes from within China is not too controversial.  It 
focuses on how the communist leadership doctrines and policies affect the arms industry 
and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  However, there appears to be a limited 
analysis on how China’s defense industry fits into the global context.  Some Chinese 
sources, at times, can be critical of government policies, but generally they tend to do it 
indirectly or focus on weaknesses that must be fixed or addressed. There is an agreement 
inside and outside China that PLA needs to be modernized.24   
However, my thesis does differ in viewpoint from those who argue China cannot 
modernize.  I look at the problem in the larger context of nation building. It is my 
contention that China’s industrialization is not linked to their ability to modernize, but 
rather that it is linked to their ability to join successful ventures.  It was not possible for 
them to develop a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry after WWII, given the 
domestic economic and political setting at the time, including the arms developments 
taking place in the developed countries.  That remains the case in the current context. 
This differs from existing literature regarding political and security influences on 
industrialization in China.  In the authors’ investigations, they link the failing to the 
symptoms, lack of technology, bureaucracy, poor oversight, corruption, bad policy, under 
funding, and dependency but not to the systemic problem of nation building. 25   
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C. CONCLUSION  
My thesis presents a starting point to a discussion on the possibility for 
developing nations to produce an advanced arms industry with no outside help.  There is 
no doubt that India and China will continue with their overall modernization efforts.  
However, in most literature there appear to be disagreements on how they will and ought 
to develop and modernize an arms industry.  In general, there are those who discuss the 
benefits of purchasing weapons, as well as those who believe it is detrimental to rely on 
other nations. 
Before China and India can turn their arms programs around, they need to know 
what is possible.  If an advanced arms industry is not feasible, what path should they 
follow for development of their industry?  What led to the successes in their nuclear and 
missile programs?  As I will show the success of the nuclear and missile programs is 
based on the presence of high political capital for certain sectors whereas the  cost of 
developing a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry is so high, only small sectors can 
be justified, given other political and economic priorities.   
11 
II. DEVELOPING NATIONS’ QUEST FOR AN INDIGENOUS 
ARMS INDUSTRY 
In this chapter, I provide the background to the problems facing developing 
nations in creating an indigenous arms industry.  This chapter will lay the foundation to 
better understand and evaluate the two cases of China and India in relation to how other 
nations with advanced arms industry have developed theirs. What are some of the phases 
of development and what are the impediments they face? 
According to Dvir and Tishler, the development of domestic advanced arms 
industry goes through four phases:  (1) producing small arms and ammunition, (2) 
producing under license, (3) modifying and improving licensed weapons, and finally (4) 
producing indigenous weapons.26  All nations usually go through the same incremental 
phases of development, with only some reaching the fourth stage.  Different factors 
influence the political will of leaders of developing nations in determining what stage of 
development to take their indigenous arms industry.  According to Edward Milenky, 
Arms production may be undertaken as one of many prestige projects or to 
satisfy the military’s bureaucratic interests.  A shortage of foreign 
exchange, political problems in acquiring foreign equipment, and a 
general preference for import substitution and a greater degree of national 
economic and strategic independence may provide more practical 
reasons.27   
According to the literature, 26-28 countries that were not industrialized prior to or 
during the war have reached the first phase of arms development since World War II.28  
While some may produce partially indigenous weapons, none have reached the fourth 
phase of development.  Nations that have reached the domestic production phase are not 
doing so independently.  The third phase is the highest some have achieved (modifying 
                                                 
26 Dov Dvir and Asher Tishler, “The Changing Role of the Defense Industry in Israel’s Industrial and 
Technological Development,” in The Place of the Defense Industry in National Systems of Innovation, 
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28 Ibid., 267. 
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and improving licensed weapons).  They either produce copies of older-generation 
equipment or still require components from developed nations.  
Countries in the higher phase that come to mind, besides India and China, are 
South Korea, South Africa, and Israel.  South Korean development can be explained by 
the fact that they inherited some industrialization from the Japanese in the pre-war era.  In 
addition, the United States pumped a significant amount of money into South Korea’s 
industrialization and weapons development in its fight against communism.  Israel, too, 
has had significant funding from the United States and other developed nations.29  
Interestingly, some of the more developed nations do not have a fully domestic advanced 
arms industry, whereas Israel supposedly has a nuclear weapon.  In the case of South 
Africa, which has developed and relinquished nuclear weapons, a fully indigenous 
advanced arms industry has yet to emerge.30  Therefore, there are no nations created or 
liberated in the post-World War II era that can lay claim to having a wholly indigenous 
advanced arms industry.  Stephanie Neuman summarizes, “[my] data show no LDC [less 
developed nation] as achieving a completely independent R&D and production capability 
for any major weapons system and its component subsystems.”31  To emphasize the 
difficulty facing developing nations in developing its advanced industry, it appears that 
the number of developed nations that possess a fully domestic advanced arms industry is 
shrinking due to globalize consolidations and mergers. 
Richard Bitzinger categorizes nations with defense industries into three tiers.  
First-tier countries are developed nations such as the United States, Britain and France 
who have fully indigenous advanced arms industries.  First-tier countries are beyond the 
fourth phase of development.  The second tier which is a larger category includes nations 
that have reached the second through fourth phases of defense industrial development 
                                                 
29 Farah Naaz, “Israel’s Arms Industry,” Strategic Analysis: a Monthly Journal of the IDSA 23, no. 12 
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yet, are not independent developers.32  Third-tier nations have only reached the first 
phase of development.  According to Bitzinger, “Third-tier states are defined as those 
possessing very limited and generally low-tech arms-production capabilities; countries in 
this group would include Egypt, Mexico and Nigeria.”33   
A. POST WORLD WAR II:  STARTING FROM SCRATCH  
Following World War II, several developing countries that wanted to create an 
indigenous arms industry also faced a daunting task of creating modern nation-states.  
From an economic standpoint, the resources they would require for industrialization and 
modernization were staggering.  Not only did these nations, for the most part, have to 
create an industrial base, but they had to establish a national identity, stable government, 
infrastructure, bureaucracy to run the country, and educational systems.  The choice to 
develop advanced weapons added to the burden.  According to Bitzinger,   
Advanced weapons systems involving major original development efforts 
can require considerable inputs of additional – and generally expensive – 
resources in the form of scientists, engineers, technicians, equipment, and 
production technology.  At the same time, such technology is highly 
perishable and must be constantly replenished, demanding still more 
inputs.34   
None of these nations has overcome the hurdles of developing a fully indigenous 
advanced arms industry while developing a modern state at the same time.   
1. The Decision to Develop  
Developing nations after World War II needed to choose between buying 
weapons and developing their own.  The argument is similar to that of whether to adopt 
import substitution model versus foreign direct investment model.35  Neuman argues that 
only larger nations like India and China had the realistic option of developing an 
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32 Ibid. 
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advanced arms industry because of their size and available resources.36  Those that did 
decide to develop on their own, according to Bitzinger, did so for many reasons:  “…to 
possess an indigenous and therefore secure source of armaments; to promote industrial 
and technological development; to save or to make money; and for reasons of pride and 
prestige.”37   
Developing countries without an industrial base faced multiple hurdles in creating 
an advanced arms industry.  As a typical chicken-and-egg argument, the question was 
which to build first; civilian or defense industry, or civilian industrial base and arms 
industry at the same time?  The choice was based on more than just the availability of 
resources.  For example, Israel chose defense first due to the threats it confronted.  
Sharon Sadeh points out that “Israel’s search for qualitative superiority over its neighbors 
underlined the need for technologically advanced systems.  They made more resources 
available for the defense industries, which became a major component of the Israeli 
economy.”38  For Israel, national defense had greater political capital than other 
components.  
In the current context, developing nations have to decide what level of native 
defense production capacity they need.  Many factors determine the level they strive to 
reach, but nearly all have some first-phase capacity (small arms and ammunition 
production).  Higher the phase, the more difficult it is to reach.  According to analysts 
such as Milenky and Neuman, getting past the first phase of development is difficult,39 
and those that do get past it, get stuck in the second phase.40  No matter the level they 
strive to reach, most developing nations try to build both civilian and defense industries 
at the same time due to political demands and security threats.   
a. Social Tensions and Political Will 
To build a defense or civilian industry requires technologies new nations 
do not have, an infrastructure they have yet to fully develop, and lack capital to build or 
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37  Bitzinger, Problems, 2. 
38 Sharon Sadeh, “Israel’s Beleaguered Defense Industry,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 
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buy what they do not have.  To industrialize, they must spend money on research and 
development and, where possible, purchase technology.  Bitzinger observes that there are 
“… quite significant start-up costs to arms production, as laboratories and research 
facilities must be established, factories must be built, machinery purchased, and 
scientists, technicians and workers trained.”41   
Other priorities facing a newly created or independent take up political capital.  
Bitzinger also writes, “Throughout the developing world, economic shortages and 
competition over limited resources directly or indirectly cause social tensions.”42  
Tensions increase or decrease the political capital of different sectors. The greater the 
social crisis, the greater the political capital to resolve it.  The question for developing 
nations’ leaders is: do they spread the resources evenly or do they create priorities to 
maximize limited resources?   
b. Security Threat’s Influence on Political Will 
In addition to social tensions, often a real or perceived security threat or 
lack thereof will influence how great the political will is to use limited resources on the 
defense industry.  In general, the greater the threat, the greater the political will to spend 
on defense, and the less the threat, the less the political will.  According to Sadeh in 
Israel, for example, “The Israeli government has allocated many resources, most of them 
at the expense of other pressing requirements like housing and infrastructure, in order to 
establish an independent military industrial base”43 because of their very real security 
threat.  For Israel, the political capital for the defense industry was greater than the 
political capital of housing and infrastructure caused by social tensions.  Sometimes the 
more immediate threat will lead to purchasing rather than development due to the long 
lead times.   In case of China and India, however, I will show the security threat has been 
intermittent, affecting how much is spent on the defense sector. 
 
 
                                                 
41 Bitzinger, Problems, 4. 
42 Albert Keidel, “China’s Social Unrest: The Story Behind the Stories,” Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Policy Brief 48 (September 2006): 3. www.CarnegieEndowment.org (accessed 21 Sep 
06)  
43 Sadeh, “Israel’s,” 2. 
16 
c. Power’s Influence on Political Will 
Political will can also be influenced by patronage, corruption, or fear of 
losing power and/or influence. In other words, politics will affect political will. The 
decision to support the defense sector will depend on the government’s will to overcome 
the aspects mentioned above to sabotage it.  Budget cuts demonstrate the influence of 
political capital on a government’s choice for cutting costs.  Robert Looney and David 
Winterford describe that “… officials often follow rather ad hoc rules for making large 
contractions in a short time, cutting new rather than ongoing projects … and favoring 
ministries that are politically powerful.”44  The political capital of older programs is, 
more often than not, stronger than new programs.  Ministries and programs threatened by 
the cuts, that are politically powerful, use the power to protect themselves, diverting 
funds from defense.  
2. Development Still Requires Purchasing  
The decision to use scarce political capital is made more difficult in discussing 
advanced weapons because developing nations also have to purchase weapons or critical 
components from developed nations to stay updated.  Even second-tier nations that have 
entered the higher phases of development in the advanced arms industry are still 
dependent on other nations.45  According to Bitzinger,   
While these countries have certainly developed a capacity to produce 
finished weapons systems, they have been unable to eliminate or even 
substantially reduce their subordination to foreign suppliers.  Local arms 
production continues to rely heavily upon foreign inputs for weapons 
design, engineering and development assistance, critical components and 
subsystems, machine tools, and production know-how.46 
Crane, too, has found the same in his investigation of China’s fighter program, 
which is well-rooted in phase three.  It “… has had to rely on imports of planes or key 
components to obtain aircraft that are even somewhat competitive with those by the 
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United States.”47  As these countries try to build their industry, they are still dependant on 
developed nations. The India and China chapter will demonstrate this in more details. 
Purchasing weapons and components from foreign countries drains resources 
from research and development for building weapons and industrial infrastructure. 
Current trends show that even the purchasing of weapons needed to stay updated is 
getting more difficult because of the skyrocketing cost of advanced weapons.  Richard 
Grimmett states,  
Various developing nations have reduced their weapons purchase 
primarily due to their lack of sufficient funds to pay for such weapons.  
Even those prospective arms purchasers in the developing world with 
significant assets continue to exercise cautions before embarking on new 
and costly weapons procurement programs.48 
Budgets are tight and there is not much money to spend on purchasing, let alone 
developing their own industry. To make matters more complex, foreign pressure, 
corruption, and patronage sometimes influence the purchase of weapons that are not the 
best value for the money. 
a. More Resources Required 
If developing nations choose to create their own advanced arms industry, 
they will require more resources than developed nations.  First, they have to create 
industries and infrastructure, both civilian and defense, that do not exist.  Developed 
nations already had industry and infrastructure in place before World War II.  Therefore, 
they can focus on upgrading existing infrastructure, building newer or more advanced 
infrastructure, and/or can put money into other areas such as research and development 
which is not as expensive.  Second, developing nations need to spend more on research 
and development because they are behind technologically.  They have to find a way of 
educating people on the basics and simultaneously doing advanced research. Developed 
nations may update weapons by purchasing but that also requires more funds taking away 
funds from research. Third, since developed nations actually spend more on research and 
development, developing nations fall further behind.  The United States spent 13 percent 
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or $69.4 billion of its $441.8 billion defense budget on R&D in 2006.49  India spent 5 
percent or $1.08 billion of its $23.6 billion defense budget on R&D in 2006.50  China 
data is harder to obtain but according to a Rand report, they spent $37.6 billion on 
research and development in 1999, and the United States spent $244 billion.51  Fourth, 
developing nations have to purchase weapons to stay caught up, especially if there are 
security threats, perceived or real.  Fifth, they have to create the institutions and human 
capital to allow them to create, maintain, and operate the weapons.52  
China and India are no different than other developing nations and face the 
same challenges.  Bitzinger found domestic weapons production in developing nations 
“… is typically geared toward meeting domestic requirements, which in turn usually 
means small, inefficient production runs and high unit costs.  In fact, in many second-tier 
states it is increasingly difficult to justify arms production from a profit-oriented 
approach.”53  Even the United States with its wealth and well established defense 
industry is doing the same with its purchase of the F-22 Raptor.  United States’ Air Force 
leaders have had to continuously justify the cost of the fighter to the Congress.54  Budget 
cuts are forcing the United States Air Force to reduce the total number of aircraft 
purchased.  The research and production cost concentrated in fewer aircraft increase the 
cost of each fighter. 
b. Civilian Development First 
Logic would dictate that the less-developed nations develop the civilian 
side during secure times, get caught up technologically, and then switch gears and 
transfer that knowledge to the defense industry.  However, developing a civilian sector 
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first to use the civilian-based technology on military equipment does not work as well as 
it would seem.  The China chapter demonstrates the problem.  Having a secure 
environment over the last 50 years to build a civilian economy, while not worrying about 
national security, is a luxury few nations have been able to enjoy. For those nations that 
choose to build the civilian sector first, the secure times are not long enough to develop 
weapons or do the research and development required.  Since the real or perceived 
security environment does not allow for this, nations are forced to purchase weapons to 
stay competitive militarily.   
To emphasize the great lengths of time to develop defense equipment, a 
study published in Defense and Peace Economics55 shows there is a tremendous lag time 
between research and development, fielding of a military system, and the quality of that 
system.  In their study of developed nations, “… investment made 10-25 years 
beforehand predominantly determines military equipment quality.”56  If developed 
nations must invest in military research and development 10 to 25 years in advance, then 
the task confronting developing nations is daunting.  They are already significantly 
behind technologically, have fewer research-and-development capabilities and fewer 
resources. This research also supports the notion that, in times of crisis or international 
tension, money poured into the defense industry will not produce results during the crisis.  
To add to their problem, the licensed equipment they build in hopes of modernizing their 
industry is also out of date.  According to Neuman, “Military technologies produced by 
Third World countries under license in 1980 were, on average, designed and developed 
twenty-two years earlier.”57  This forces the purchase of weapons to meet the immediate 
threat diverting scarce resources from their goal, indigenous development. 
B. POST COLD WAR: IS IT TOO LATE? 
The end of the Cold War unleashed a new era for defense industries around the 
world, which made it more difficult for developing nations to develop their own defense 
sectors.58  Almost overnight, with the surplus supply of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons 
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and the United States’ defense industries fiercely fighting for markets, the global market 
changed from a seller’s to a buyer’s market.  Defense industries in both developed and 
underdeveloped nations have been forced to consolidate or close.  The United States’ 
aerospace defense industry, for example, went from 14 major companies to four in just 
three years.59  How do nations with lower-quality and lower-technological equipment and 
an underdeveloped industry capacity compete? Developing nations can purchase more 
sophisticated equipment from developed nations at better prices than if they acquire them 
from indigenous sources.60  It is like a “Mom and Pop” general store trying to compete 
with a global giant like Wal-Mart.  Bitzinger sums it up well when he writes,  
… amongst the most advanced and large-scale arms producing countries - 
e.g., the Unites States, Britain, and France – hundreds of thousands of 
defense workers have been made redundant … as military factories have 
cut back production or closed down.  However much the larger arms-
producing states have been pummeled by these developments, the long-
term viability of these countries’ defense industries has never been in 
doubt. … The same cannot be said for the smaller, “second-tier” arms-
producing countries.61 
1. Developed Nations’ and Advanced Arms Industries in the Post-Cold 
War 
To emphasize the difficulties of developing nations, one has to simply look at the 
difficulties facing developed nations’ arms industries since the end of the Cold War.  
Defense industries from the West and former Soviet Block nations are all trying to adapt 
to the new world.  Former Warsaw Pact nations with their existing advanced arms 
industry fared no better than some large developing nations and are facing the same 
challenges as developing or second-tier nations.  Hungary and Slovakia, for example, 
both have an established advanced arms industry as a result of the Warsaw Pact.  Jeffrey 
Bialos states, however, “… like other defense industries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the more sophisticated equipment was often manufactured with key parts either imported 
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from the Soviet Union or produced under Soviet license,”62 making the two nations more 
like second-tier producers than first.  Both, however, are going through what China and 
other developing nation’s defense industries are currently going through.  Yudit Kiss 
states, “... they have deep structural problems, serious financial burdens and insecure 
future prospects.”63  
The fact a nation is “developed” does not mean the country possesses a fully 
indigenous arms industry.  Nor does it mean that if a nation becomes “developed” it will 
automatically have a domestic arms industry.  In his research, Brauer lists developed and 
newly developed industrialized nations that do not have a fully native advanced arms 
industry.64 For example, According to Dvir and Tishler, even a more developed nation 
like Israel suffered.  “Israeli defense industry, like defense industries elsewhere, suffers 
from excess capacity and, hence, inefficient operation.”65  Nations such as Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Israel have resources many other developing nations do not, such as 
technology, infrastructure, and human capital, are also struggling to survive. 66  This does 
not bode well for developing nations’ ambitions to develop or maintain their arms 
industries.  Bitzinger sums it up nicely when he states,  
Second-tier countries in all these categories share a number of growing 
challenges to their arms industries, which are only exacerbated by the 
brutal realities of the post-Cold War era.  Arms production in these 
countries is already or increasingly overcapacitized, inefficient, and cost-
ineffective.  At the same time, the technological and resource demands of 
advanced weapon systems – and advanced armaments production – have 
grown at a rate beyond the abilities of most of these states to keep pace.   
Finally, the growing availability of relatively cheap, advanced weapons 
systems in a saturated, post-Cold War ‘buyer’s market’ for arms has 
undermined much of the rationale for continuing to produce arms 
indigenously.67 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Developing nations’ leaders after World War II had a tremendous burden of 
nation building that forced them to make a tough decision.  Different factors shaped 
where the political will to use scarce resources lay.  For many nations, trying to create an 
indigenous arms industry after World War II was like building a four-story house in 
which they have to build all four floors at the same time.  The first floor of the house is 
national identity, the government, and educational institutions.  The second floor is the 
basic infrastructure and industrial base.  The third floor is the indigenous arms industry 
and the fourth is national security.  All the floors are all competing for resources and 
stability. Different influences on a floor determined how much political capital there was 
to spend on each level.  Like a conventional house, however, many of the elements of the 
lower floors need to be in place to build successful upper floors.  The third floor, 
indigenous arms industry, requires the first two floors to be complete in order to be 
successful.  The fourth floor, national security, often cannot wait for the third floor to be 
complete, so weapons are purchased to provide an instant third floor which is very costly 
forcing cut backs on other levels.  
A look at countries that had advanced arms industries prior to the fall of the Iron 
Curtain illustrates how truly difficult it is for developing nations to maintain the industry.  
Even with the infrastructure in place and human capital to build it, the developed nations 
are having trouble maintaining the advanced arms industry and acquiring needed 
resources from the government.  These difficulties illustrate how hard it will be for 
developed nations’ advanced arms industries to catch up.  A more ominous signal is, 
while developing nations are trying to catch up, even advanced European nations are 
having a hard time staying caught up with the United States.   
There is a widening military-capabilities gap forming between the Unites States and 
Europe.68  In conclusion, developing nations’ indigenous advanced arms industries are 
facing poor prospects for developing their own wholly arms industry.69   
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III. CHINA’S QUEST FOR AN INDIGENOUS ADVANCED ARMS 
INDUSTRY 
For the past two decades, two giants, India and China are trying to take their place 
on the world stage economically and militarily.  The purpose of the chapter is to examine 
the political and economic hindrances to China’s development of the advanced arms 
industry. Its limited success in the advanced arms sector is surprising considering its 
growing economic power and political influence across the world.  By focusing on what 
prevents China from successfully developing a wholly indigenous arms industry will 
shed light on what to expect from developing nations.  
A. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC): POST WORLD WAR II 
AND CIVIL WAR 
When the PRC formed in 1949, it was a devastated nation.  The Civil War, World 
War II, Sino-Japanese War, and the Opium Wars all left it depleted of resources.  When 
the Communists took over China, its leaders, like those in other developing nations, 
wanted their country to grow and prosper.  However, China took the Socialist/Leninist 
path, and the decision did not lead to prosperity.70  In great undertakings, there are 
always unintended consequences and mistakes, and the Chinese Communist Party’s 
decisions led to many.  Communist ideology, international security threat, and some 
paranoia helped shape the Chinese political will that drove economic and industrial 
decisions.  While not all developing nations are communist nations, many faced similar 
challenges as they try to create an indigenous advance arms industry.  Here, I will discuss 
some of the actions the Chinese state took during the Mao Xuedong period that promoted 
or impeded the development of China’s advanced arms industry. 
Upon defeating Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang forces in the civil war, the 
Chinese communists took over mainland China.  The country had barely experienced 
industrialization and the war had devastated large segments of it.71 The civil war supplied 
an experienced and battle tested military but, according to Jonathan Pollack, Mao did not 
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consider them fully prepared for securing China. China’s security, Mao further argued, 
“… could only be guaranteed by substantially enhancing the nation’s military 
capabilities.”72  China did not have a modern fighting force, or the capacity to produce 
one. They did, however, have significant number of people which led to Mao’s concept 
of the “People’s War.”  While he planned to overwhelm an enemy with human waves, he 
still wanted a modern military but the “People’s War” concept and the Third Front 
eventually hinder the development of the arms industry.73  
B. MAO’S INDUSTRIALIZATION GOALS, INDEPENDENCE AND SELF 
RELIANCE  
The PRC’s objective was the creation of an indigenous arms industry capable of 
equipping the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).74  However, what China wanted to do, 
what it was capable of doing because of resources and technical limitations, and what it 
did were all different.  Was this imbalance due to lack of trying, resources, or 
competence?  Mao faced the challenge of governing a country with 541 million people 
however, his experience lay mainly in war fighting.75  He faced the significant problems 
of how to industrialize, build a modern fighting force, and feed his people.  As a 
developing nation, China could not afford to do everything it wanted.  Therefore, the 
decision was made to seek the Soviet Union’s aid in industrializing but even then the 
Chinese had to prioritize development.  The Soviets provided resources and expertise.  It 
was not until the Sino-Soviet split that self-reliance became an imperative.76     
1. Economics Development and Stability Take Priority at the Founding 
of the PRC 
As with other newly formed countries following World War II, one of the first 
orders of business for the Communist regime was to create economic stability.  The 
choice to place economic stability before the development of an arms industry was made 
in order to stay in power.  The Communist realized that one of the factors leading to the 
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downfall of the Kuomintang government was hyperinflation that eroded their legitimacy 
and support.  In the early days of the PRC, the Communist made the choice to first 
contain inflation and rebuild the economy before focusing on other sectors.77  To contain 
inflation, the Communists created a new currency and nationalized the banks, restoring 
confidence and stability for economic development.78  With the heavy assistance of the 
Soviets, the early years of Import Substitution (ISI) produced growth in China.79  The 
economic stability was not only to maintain legitimacy but to also provide the foundation 
for industrialization, economic development and to pave the way for the socialist 
revolution.  In turn, this would help build their arms industry.  Beijing’s choice was to 
maintain power first through economic stability then industrialization.  
2. Politics and the Korean War Force China to Rely on the Soviet Union 
Chinese leaders, particularly Mao, reactions to political and security factors have 
played a critical role in hurting China’s economic development.  Although the 
Communist Party ran China, the most influential and dominant figure determining the 
political will was Mao.80  All defense industries are influenced by the domestic 
situations, but China’s defense industries were all nationalized State Owned Industries 
(SOEs).  In the past six decades, as an authoritarian country, China’s defense SOEs 
support was particularly impacted by changes in government, security environment, and 
economy.  China’s arms industry rode the rollercoaster of politics, achieving higher 
priority in times of a perceived threat and then took a back seat when the threat 
decreased.  This pattern has persisted, hence, the problem facing the defense industry is 
when they are expected to perform in times of threat, past indifference and poor funding 
hamper their ability to perform and produce. 81   
One year after establishing the new communist country, Mao signed a treaty with 
the Soviet Union and also fought a war in Korea.  At first, the United States had 
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contemplated maintaining relations with the PRC as a tool against the Soviet Union.  The 
result of the choice to side with the Soviet Union and North Korea changed the equation 
and reinforced the United States’ fear of communism’s spread.82  The United States led a 
total embargo of western military technology and pushed the world to recognize the 
exiled Nationalists in Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. 83  Consequently, 
the PRC had no other choice but to deepen its ties with the Soviet Union for assistance in 
their economic and industrial development.84  The Soviet connection is important to 
understand in why the development of China’s advanced arms industry failed.  The split 
with the Soviet Union over communist ideology and the future of communism, further 
isolated the PRC from the world.  The Korean War did not help the country’s quest for 
industrialization. 
3. Soviet Influence 
The PRC’s isolation from the rest of the world by the United States had 
significant impact on the future development of China.  As a result, China had to use 
Soviet technology and manufacturing techniques.  The techniques set them down a path 
that was less effective than that of the west, magnifying the existing problems of the 
developing nation.85  
Mao looked to the Soviets in modeling China’s economy and arms industry, but 
failed to realize China did not have the same infrastructure, urbanization, industrial and 
agricultural base the Soviets had.  Urbanization, industrialization and development of the 
small agriculture sector were already underway prior to the Soviet’s First Five Year 
Plan.86 The Soviet model used surpluses from agriculture to finance industrialization.  
When the Chinese based their First Five Year Plan on the Soviet’s, they did not take the 
difference into account. The oversight negatively impacted the First Five Year Plan and 
the development of the defense industry because the Chinese did not have the surpluses 
to put into industrialization, nor did they invest in agriculture to increase yield to produce 
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the surpluses.87  China could not continue to squeeze agriculture and light industry and 
therefore, the Second Five Year Plan reflected the changed plan in agriculture and light 
industry.  However, by the Third Five Year Plan, ideology and the security environment 
again changed political will that was guiding the state.   
4. Sino-Soviet Split Left China Feeling Surrounded and Alone 
The Sino Soviet split in 1959 cut off China from its only ally leaving it virtually 
isolated.  After the break, China felt greatly threatened by the Soviets.  The split was 
caused by the Soviet’s destalinization, treaty with Mongolia, invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
and border clashes along the Chinese border.88  Apart from the situation with the Soviets, 
United States’ involvement in the second Taiwan crisis and the Vietnam War added to 
the Chinese insecurities.  Beijing did not like the close proximity of United States’ troops 
to Chinese boarders.89  Detente between the Soviets and the United States made the 
Chinese feel like both superpowers were against them along with their allies.  China felt 
surrounded and alone.90  The fear of being surrounded by two superpowers led to the 
concept of the Third Front which severely hampered the nation’s defense industry.91  
a. The Third Front 
The Third Front had less to do with economic prosperity than it did with 
perceived survival.  After the split with the Soviets, Mao believed China’s coastal 
industrial base was too vulnerable to attack.  Since the Chinese industrial heart was 
vulnerable to a United States naval or Soviet land attack, the plan called for the 
development of China’s interior.  Industrialization of the interior would allow China’s 
war machine to function in the event the coast should fall.92  A threat to national security 
and the fact that China was cut off from sources of advanced weapons elevated the 
political capital for the indigenous defense industry. 
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From 1966-1976 China put 40 to 60 percent of its budget into the Third 
Front.93  However, the attempt to put the defense industry first had negative affects with 
dire consequences.  Not only did it hurt the defense industry, it also put China’s 
economic development decades behind illustrating that even when the political will and 
resources are spent, it does not guarantee success in creating an advanced arms sector.94   
The Third Front, in effect, started China’s industrialization over from the 
beginning, putting them further behind where they should have been had they been able 
to share technology.  The new plan wasted vast material and human capital resources.95  
Crucial for modernization, the Third Front skimped on research and development and the 
industrialization of the interior was rushed, isolated, and did not take advantage of 
economy of scale.96  The perceived threat seemed so immediate that the defense industry 
was not developed in rational and efficient manner.  The plan was also not designed to 
create a fully indigenous advanced arms industry.  Except for nuclear weapons and 
missiles, the Third Front was designed to supply weapons in mass for a “People’s War,” 
not create an infrastructure to design and build sophisticated weapons.97  The People’s 
War concept was to use the three operational tactics of space, time, and force.  Sheer 
numbers of people would overwhelm the enemy given time and space, requiring less 
technologically sophisticated equipment.  The coast, where the industry was, became the 
space to spread the enemy out and overwhelm them.  Whereas, the industry was to be 
hidden in the interior.  China could allow the coast to fall and still have weapons 
producing capability.  However, only certain sectors were properly funded and managed.  
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C. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES GROW UNDER MAO WHILE 
THE FIGHTER INDUSTRY LANGUISHES 
In my hypothesis, I proposed advanced arms industries will not fully materialize 
in developing nations.  Leaders do not have the political will to use their scarce political 
capital and economic resources on the industry because of other competing 
developmental interests.  I state, however, that certain sectors within the defense industry 
can garner the political capital and resources to develop and mature.  One of the few 
successes China’s advanced arms industries has had is its nuclear and missile programs.  
Similar development’s have taken place in India as I shall show in the next chapter. What 
has led to the success in China’s nuclear and missile programs but its failure in the fighter 
industry is political will.  Mao committed the resources and human capital for one but not 
the other. 
The factors that determine the use of limited resources in the defense industry is 
not static and changes over time.  In China, the fighter industry’s importance rises and 
falls depending on the domestic and international climate.  The nuclear program, 
however, is not affected by the changing of seasons.  There is a consistent support for 
nuclear research because it provides greater returns on investment.  
1. Strategic Weapons 
The sector of the defense industry that Chinese leaders willingly focused their 
scarce resources on was strategic weapons programs (nuclear bombs and missiles).98  
Given the availability of low resources, it was an obvious choice to develop.  Evan 
Feigenbaum writes, that because of the “… gaping holes in Chinese aircraft and other 
conventional industries made strategic weapons the best options.99  First, nuclear 
weapons bring international prestige and security through deterrence.100  Second, nuclear 
research can be applied to civilian purpose of providing nuclear power.  Once you have 
the nuclear weapons, they require a delivery system resulting in a missile program.  It is 
afforded higher importance (greater political capital) than a program such as fighters 
because of its close association with the success of another vital program.  A nuclear 
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missile provides prestige and national security.  Unlike fighters, only a few nuclear 
missiles will make an adversary think twice before attacking.   
With all its political capital, the nuclear and missile industries received more 
resources and research than any other defense industries.  More importantly, during the 
Cultural Revolution, Great Leap Forward, Hundred Flowers, and other campaigns the 
nuclear and missile programs’ human capital received protection.  Unlike most other 
defense industries, the nuclear and missile sector did not suffer purges of its 
intellectuals.101 
2. Fighter Program 
Looking at the fighter industry is a good representation of the low status afforded 
non-strategic weapons programs.102  The indigenous fighter industry did not fare as well 
as the nuclear and missile programs under Mao for a number of reasons.  While the 
fighter industry has dual uses, the aviation industry does not bring international prestige 
like nuclear research.  In addition, nuclear weapons create a deterrence that is not 
matched by fighters or bombers.  Therefore, in China, the fighter industry did not receive 
the resources the nuclear program did. 
In addition, the fighter industry had deficient and poor oversight in the use of 
what little resources it had.103  The inadequate oversight was due to Soviet techniques but 
also government bureaucracy which was not held accountable for failures and purges of 
those with technical abilities. 104  Lewis and Litai write, during the Third Front era “… 
the aviation ministry wasted 65.8 percent of its R&D funds.”105  When Mao died, the 
result was that the native fighters had obsolete systems which were based on leftover 
1950s Soviet designs and techniques.106  Therefore, China was a second-tier arms 
producing nation at phase three of development.  In addition to wasting resources, the 
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aviation industry spread what little resources it had among many projects.107  China 
produced only one partial success that was outdated on delivery. 108   
The fighter industry also did not receive the political protection afforded the 
nuclear industry during the political campaigns and purges.  Communist Party’s moves to 
consolidate power and continue the revolution resulted in the fighter industry drained of 
its human capital as fighter designers and engineers became targets of the purges.109 The 
targeting of the very people needed to develop and modernize the fighter industry, lack of 
resources, and poor oversight resulted in an overall failure when it came to a fully 
domestic fighter industry.   
D. DEFENSE SECTOR IN THE POST MAO PERIOD 
The lack of support to develop the defense industry over other sectors did not fair 
any better after Mao’s death.  After a short power struggle, Deng Xiaoping took the 
mantle of leadership of China in 1977.  At the time, China was industrially lagging 
behind its neighbors.  China’s defense industry was also 20-30 years behind and only 
capable of producing 1950s Soviet based systems. 110 
Decreased threat perceptions based on a changing international environment 
allowed Deng to focus on economic development rather than defense.  According to 
Huaqing, “Deng Xiaoping put forward a thesis that a world war would not break out for a 
fairly long time, bringing a strategic change to the guiding ideology for army-
building.”111  Without an external threat, the political capital of the defense industry 
dropped significantly.  Deng sought to catch up on lost economic opportunities, restarting 
China’s economy, and close the gap with the rest of the developed world.  The choice 
brought an end to Mao’s developmental disaster known as the Third Front and refocused 
China’s political will almost entirely on economic development.  
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1. Economic Development First 
The new development model switched the PRC from the ISI to foreign direct 
investment (FDI).  FDI is one of the most important contributing factors to China’s 
extraordinary economic growth in the current context.  Fifty percent of the FDI coming 
into China is in the form of joint ventures.112  In 1994, it accounted for 13.9 percent of 
industrial output and 37 percent of foreign trade.  By 1995, with a few exceptions like the 
defense industry, everything was open to FDI and 100 percent foreign-owned enterprises 
were allowed.113  Since 1992, China has received the most FDI in the developing 
world.114  Under Deng’s reforms and changes, civilian industry took off but the defense 
industry continued to lag.115   
Deng proposed the Four Modernizations to restart China’s economy.  The Four 
Modernizations are industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense.  
Military modernization and indigenous development is the lowest priority.116  The first 
priority, civilian economic development, is envisioned as a way to help military industrial 
development by generating resources and industrial capabilities that can be transferred to 
the defense industry.117 
Although civilian economic development has led to exceptional economic growth 
in China, there has not been a significant increase in the defense budget.  This is 
particularly true when inflation is factored in.  According to Cole and Godwin, with all 
the economic growth of China in the past decade, it “… has not yet approached the 
research and production capabilities that mark a major military power.  Placing national 
defense fourth in the ‘Four Modernizations’ investment priorities established in 1978 
took its toll on the defense industries.”118   
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2. Quest for Legitimacy Increased the Political Capital of Economic 
Development 
The primary focuses of Chinese leaders’ is to stay in power and maintain their 
legitimacy.119  Even before China became the only real bastion of communist power 
remaining in the world, establishing legitimacy in the eyes of their people and the world 
was a top priority.  If Beijing could not establish their legitimacy through Communist 
ideals, then they would do it by focusing on economic growth.  
As China’s economic development takes off, it continues to face a deficit of 
resources and challenging internal domestic problems.  Solving internal domestic 
problems through economic development has more political capital than producing 
advanced weapons.  The defense industry has suffered because of the choice to solve 
domestic problems.120  It is not that Deng or subsequent leaders thought military 
modernization of the PLA and defense industry is unimportant.  Economic development 
is seen as a means to fund modernization.121   
While the external threat has greatly dissipated, the internal domestic threat is 
ever present.  The economic growth and prosperity Beijing pins their legitimacy to is a 
double-edged sword. Unemployment is rising, the inequality between the rich and poor is 
growing, environmental problems have worsened, and corruption remains ever 
present.122  Poverty and desperation can cause social tensions but so can a widening gap 
between the haves and have nots.123  Social tensions have been rising in China as have 
the protests and demonstrations.  There were 8,700 mass disturbances in 1993, a figure 
which rose to 83,000 in 2005.124  Increased social tensions lower the importance of an 
indigenous advanced arms industry and increase the importance of economic reform. 
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3. Civilian Industry as the Foundation 
The priority of the Four Modernizations show China is trying to create the civilian 
economic base before building an advanced arms industry.125  In addition to solving 
legitimacy problems, the building of the commercial industrial sector is seen as a way to 
generate resources, develop the technological base, and build infrastructure to modernize 
the defense industry.126  For the most part, however, it is not clear if this is a successful 
strategy.  The defense industry is falling behind the civilian sector and not producing 
advanced weapons which are competitive with foreign manufacturers in developed 
nations.127  
a. Technology Transfer 
The often assumed ability to transfer technology from civilian to military 
use is not working well in China.  The goal of developing the economy first, instead of 
the military industrial complex, implies that in addition to resources and infrastructure 
there will be technology that can be adapted to military use.  The track record of 
developing nations’ ability to transfer civilian technology to the defense industry is poor.  
China too is having a hard time applying civilian technology to weapons systems.128  
Even if China can apply dual use technology in a weapon system, they have to make it 
work with what they already have.  Cole and Godwin write, “… system and technology 
integration is a complex, demanding requirement … only slightly less critical is the 
precision required to manufacture advanced-technology systems, a capability not well 
established in China’s industrial base.”129  Transfer of technology and integration are 
failing for the same reasons as the defense industry.  Since political will is focused 
elsewhere, it lacks resources for research and development, human capital and suffers 
from poor oversight.130 
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4. State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the New Era 
Chinese transition to an export economy and entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) required reform of China’s SOEs for a number of reasons.  The 
most important is lowering of protectionist barriers to foreign competition.131  The 
inefficient SOEs now have to compete with foreign manufacturers.132  It also has to 
compete with the domestic private sector fighting for market shares.  As private domestic 
competition increase, the plight of the SOEs is getting worse.  Wortzel found SOEs drain 
resource from the defense industry and the economy as a whole. In addition SOEs “… are 
operating at a loss of about 1 percent of China’s GDP each year.”133  Funds used to cover 
the losses of the SOEs drains money from the development of the defense sector. 
The problems of the SOEs hurt the defense industry in other ways.  Beijing is 
forcing defense SOEs to sell or divest itself of profitable portions while keeping the 
unprofitable portions.  Due to lack of resources during the late Mao and early Deng era, 
the PLA operated SOEs produced products that were not defense related to generate 
funds.  More specifically, John Roos found as little as 10 years ago the PLA operated “… 
more than 15,000 business enterprises and 50,000 factories … [and] civilian production 
dominated 70 percent of the Chinese military manufacturing base.”134  Even though there 
was waste and PLA officers stuffed their pockets, the SOEs produced a necessary source 
of revenue which now the PLA is divesting from.  To add insult to injury, the defense 
industry is forced to keep SOEs that are unprofitable draining additional resources for 
employment reasons.   
In addition, like most of the defense industries in the developing world after the 
end of the Cold War, China’s defense SOEs are facing budget cuts and excess capacity.  
Like those in the less developed nations, Chinese defense manufacturers are inefficient 
and technologically backward.135  Over capacity caused by the end of the Cold War and 
the small domestic market coupled with waste and inefficiency has made the defense 
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SOEs into money losers.  Medeiros, Cliff, Crane, and Mulvenon write that “… according 
to the director of the State Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National 
Defense (COSTIND), for eight consecutive years, from 1993 to 2001, China’s entire 
defense industry, in aggregate terms, ran a net loss.”136  SOEs no longer wanted to 
produce defense equipment because it is not profitable, hampering indigenous defense 
development. 137   
In addition to the defense SOEs feeling the pressure of the new China, the defense 
industries’ human capital and research and development is also suffering.  The vital 
defense research and development centers are not only losing funding but defense 
research facilities are turning to commercial research because it is more lucrative.138  
Worse yet, the expertise required to create advanced weapons technology is seeking 
employment outside the industry where the benefits are better.139  Thus money, human 
capital, and research facilities are taken away from China’s advanced arms industry 
hampering their ability to modernize and create a fully indigenous industry.   
a. SOEs as Social Safety Nets 
Besides funneling resources to economic development, the quest of the 
Communist Party to maintain their legitimacy hurts the defense industry in other ways.  
Another reason plants do not want to undertake defense production, is because they are 
used as social security for the masses.  Reforms and world competitiveness caused by the 
export economy is not creating enough jobs in China to replace the jobs lost.  Chinese 
jobs are cut to make SOEs more efficient and competitive against the world and other 
Chinese companies. Rising unemployment increases social pressures.140 To keep 
unemployment and social unrest down, SOEs are forced by the state to keep workers who 
do not have jobs or are unproductive, draining money from SOEs and causing financial 
problems.141  The choice to keep workers is one of the reasons 81 percent of the defense 
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SOEs lost money in 1994.142  Although the thought behind the Four Modernizations is 
that the civilian side will provide for the defense industry, the transition has yet to occur.  
5. Defense Industry Falling Further Behind Developed Nations 
Due to its low political capital, China’s advanced arms industry is falling further 
behind advanced nations and China knows it.143  Nathan and Roberts write that “… most 
of the PLA continues to be equipped with old-fashioned, Chinese-made, Soviet-style 
tanks and planes.  Specialists on the Chinese military have described the PLA as the 
world’s largest military museum and as a junkyard army.144  They also know they cannot 
catch up through licensing and importation alone but continue to do so while they try to 
modernize and create a domestic industry. At the same time the advanced nations’ 
modernization is reaching a new level of sophistication.  In his review of China’s Air 
Force Kenneth Allen writes, “… the [Chinese] aviation industry continues to have a 
sprawling organization with weak facilities and low standards, and the gap between it and 
the aviation industries of developing western countries is widening.”145   
The Gulf War showed the equipment and concepts with which China designed 
their military doctrine was extremely vulnerable to modern weapons.146   In addition, the 
under funded and underdeveloped sectors of their advanced arms industry, fighters, was 
one of the main components of the RMA.147  Although the importance of airpower in 
RMA was demonstrated by the war and recognized by China, it still places airpower low  
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in priority next to nuclear and missile development.  The fighter industries political 
capital continues to remain low while strategic weapons’ remains high.  Lewis and Litai 
state,  
For a quarter century, the defense industry received mixed messages.  
Despite ritual calls to build up the conventional forces, the industry’s main 
target remained the development of nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems, and everyone knew that this goal took primacy over all others.  
Money, expertise, and political backing told the real story, and promotions 
went to those who made their mark in the strategic programs.  Where it 
mattered, few truly cared about the aviation industry.148 
One of the reasons China cannot catch up is that they underfund research and 
development compared to developing nations.149  The technological bar is not stationary.  
By the time China finishes the research and development on a project and has the 
infrastructure in place, they will still be behind.  Stephen Cohen writes, “… as India and 
China have demonstrated, it is difficult to establish a domestic weapons industry without 
having it lapse into obsolescence.”150  China’s defense research and development sector 
that do not deal with strategic weapons, lacks resources.151  The resources go toward 
higher priorities such as civilian industrial development and keeping a lid on social 
tensions.  
E. FIGHTERS IN THE POST-MAO PERIOD 
The literature points to the fact that the Chinese know modern advanced weapons, 
especially airpower, are vitally important.  The importance is made even clearer by the 
first Gulf War and the conflict in Kosovo.  While there is much discussion on the 
importance of air power, they still have not backed the rhetoric with the resources since 
the Gulf War.  It continues to rank low in priorities compared to strategic weapons and 
has been hurt by the quest for nuclear weapons and missiles.  Also, the civilian aviation  
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industry is not contributing to the advancement of the fighter industry as envisioned.152  
The result is 90 percent of the Chinese’s Air Force is obsolete with 1950s and 1960s 
technology and China is still incapable of producing indigenous fighters.153  
1. Obsolete Fighters 
One of the best examples of China’s fighter industry’s failure to produce relevant 
products is the J-8 interceptor.  Lewis and Litai’s research reveal that “… this aircraft 
began development in 1964, was first flight tested in 1969, and entered service in the 
early 1980s.  Even after a 20-year gestation period, the PLAAF still found the J-8 
unsatisfactory and, as late as 1989, dubbed it an ‘operational test aircraft.’”154  China’s 
advanced arms industry is unable to produce domestic products and continues to receive 
assistance from the Russians and the West.  Lewis and Litai go on to say, the “… 
improved J-8-2s began service with the naval air arm in 1992.  This is a total of almost 
30-year development period for what remains a below-par combat aircraft-not yet the 
equivalent of a 1960s-era U.S. F-4 Phantom.”155  At the time the J-8-2 was becoming 
operational, the United States was fielding the stealthy F-117 fighter and B-2 Bomber 
while starting research on what is now the F-22 Raptor.  Now operational, the F-22 is a 
perfect example of RMA and how far China has to go to catch up.  With China not able 
to even produce advanced aircraft in the league of the F-15 and F-18 shows how far 
behind they are.  This failure is not just in the fighter industry but represents most others 
defense industries except strategic weapons.156 
Another example is the continued licensing (phase three) of the production of the 
Russian Su-27s which is close behind the capability of F-15 and F-18s.  Though the Gulf 
War showed how important airpower was, China is still licensing production of Russian 
fighters that represent 1970s technology.  In addition, the Chinese have to return the 
aircraft to Russia for routine maintenance demonstrating of how far behind China is from 
developed nations in terms of technological advancement.157  Bernard and Cole suggest 
                                                 
152 Crane, “Modernizing,” 245. 
153 Nathan, Great Wall, 146. 
154 Cole, “Advanced,” 193. 
155 Ibid., 194. 
156 Medeiros, “New Direction,” 9. 
157 Cole, “Advanced,” 194. 
40 
that “… by the time China is capable of producing Su-27s without Russian assistance, it 
is likely … [to be] the most highly perfected obsolescent combat aircraft in the world.”158   
F. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MISSILES, POST MAO, 
REMAINS THE SAME 
As during Mao’s period, the nuclear and missile programs still have more 
political capital than any other defense industry for mostly the same reasons.  Beijing, 
knowing they had limited resources and not wanting to have the budgetary burdens of the 
defense industry that help facilitate the fall of the Soviet Union, once again has to be 
selective of what programs to developed.159  Like the nuclear program, the missile 
program has both civilian commercial and military uses.  As the world becomes more 
reliant on satellites and other space based systems, the missile program grows in 
importance both economically and militarily.160  The nuclear weapons and missile 
programs continue to get people and resources.  
Defense spending as percentage of government spending continues to fall.  As 
percent of government spending, it was 40 percent in 1950 (Third Front), 15 percent in 
1970, and 8 percent in 2000.  These numbers are more important when we look at that in 
the context of the overall GDP. As percent of GDP, defense spending was 5.5 percent in 
1979, 1 percent in 1996, and 1.7 percent in 2003. 161  However, government income has 
increased as China’s economy has grown.  These numbers illustrate the choice of not 
spending the surplus on the defense industry but on economic growth.  To bring home the 
inequalities between the strategic weapons programs and the fighter programs in China, 
all one needs to do is compare their core capabilities.  According to a study 
commissioned by the United States Department of Defense, there are 84 critical areas to 
an indigenous advanced arms industry.  According to Cole and Godwin, the only area 
where China has all the production capabilities is “nuclear weapons and nuclear material 
processing.  … In essentially all other areas of critical military technologies, China is 
extremely deficient.”162  In the nuclear arena, China has most or all of the production 
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capabilities in 13 of the 13 categories.163  Comparing the nuclear industrial capability to 
the fighter industry the difference is compelling.  While the nuclear sector has production 
capabilities in all categories, the fighter industry is only capable in 2 of 25.164 
G. CONCLUSION 
China’s indigenous advanced arms industry as a whole will not catch up because 
they have not made creating a fully domestic advanced arms industry a priority in 
comparison to other sectors such as the nuclear sector.  Although one may argue that in 
an authoritarian country, leaders would not have to worry about what the people thought 
because they are not elected.  I have, however, illustrated that maintaining legitimacy is a 
big concern, more important than developing an advanced arms industry. The Chinese 
continued focus on economic growth and maintaining employment to prevent social 
unrest demonstrates this. Even the definition of self reliance has changed indicating the 
goals have changed.  Instead of having a fully indigenous advanced arms industry (first-
tier arms production nation), the Chinese are content with having a second tier.  Huaqing 
states,  
When we stress self-reliance, we do not mean we will close the door to 
pursue our own construction.  What we mean is to actively create 
conditions to import advanced technology form abroad and borrow every 
useful experience … rely on our own strength for regeneration, while 
selectively importing advanced technology from abroad, centering on 
some areas.165 
Just because China’s economy has grown tremendously over the last few decades 
does not mean they have unlimited budget to spend on their advanced arms industry.  
Although it does not have exactly the same challenges it did under Mao, it is still a 
developing nation with all the problems a nation faces traveling toward the goal of 
modernity.  They face growing inequality between rich and poor, a massive population, 
pollution, an aging population, a banking industry on the verge of collapse, and growing 
energy needs. 166   
                                                 
163 Cole, “Advanced,” 173. 
164 Ibid., 192-193. 
165 Huaqing, “Unswervingly,” 19. 
166 Brook Larmer, “Manchurian Mandate,” National Geographic 210, no. 3 (September 2006): 50. 
42 
Beijing can put military modernization ahead of the economy if it chose to use it 
growing resources there, but it does not.  Even if China did, I doubt, due to corruption 
and other problems plaguing China, they could do it.  Also, politically I do not think the 
regime would survive if they made military advancement a priority.  The increased social 
tensions it would create by diverting funds away from economic development would 
eliminate the regime’s legitimacy.  In addition, it may be too late to for China in terms of 
technological advancement.  Future advanced weapons will be so expensive that no 
nation will be able to develop and procure them on their own.  The future for China’s 




IV. INDIA’S QUEST FOR AN INDIGENOUS ADVANCE ARMS 
INDUSTRY 
Of the world’s developing nations, two giants, India and China, are trying to take 
their place on the world stage economically, politically, and militarily.  India and China 
were both influenced by “Uncle Joe” Stalin’s successful industrialization of the Soviet 
Union.  Although industrializing placed many in desperate conditions across the world, 
industrialization of the Soviet Union under Stalin was excessive.167  It is a method that 
could be duplicated in China but clearly not in a democratic India.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine what hinders India’s development of an advanced arms industry 
where only some of the smaller sectors have been successful.  If this growing power 
cannot create a fully indigenous arms industry then there is little hope that developing 
nations with lesser resources will succeed.  According to John P. Lewis, writing on 
Indian political economy,  
Save for China, the Indians had the biggest playing field-biggest in terms 
of the numbers of people, scale and varieties of terrain, varieties of natural 
resources, and the country’s early scatter of industrialization-on which to 
play out a strategy of self-reliance on the lines of a closed economy.168   
A. INDIA IN POST WORLD WAR II 
India, like China, is a rising world power and is on the verge of achieving the 
economic success that South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have achieved in the post- 
World War II era.  According to Nicholas Burns, “Within the first quarter of this century, 
it [India] is likely to be numbered among the world’s five largest economies.”169  For 
India, this is would be a great achievement given that at the time of independence in 
1947, India was an impoverished country with a majority of the population facing dire 
conditions.  It is daunting to think of what the leaders of India had to do to create a nation 
and all that is associated with that undertaking.  The leaders of India were trying to 
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industrialize while at the same time dealing with a mass migration caused by the 
partition, poverty, wars, drought, and floods.   
India was left with the legacy of colonialization, which drained the country of 
large number of its resources, at the same time, left some institutions which have been 
beneficial in the current world.  Most importantly, the British left India with a functioning 
bureaucracy more than capable of running a country, an English speaking population, and 
a military that was rooted in civilian control.  On the other hand, concerning the defense 
industry, the British left behind basic small arms and artillery sector not capable of 
creating advance weapons, which is phase one of Dvir and Tisher’s four phases of 
defense industrial development.  According to Onkar Marwah,  
The country had acquired about a dozen ordinance factories but the only 
lethal weapons produced (when imported gun metal was available) were 
the Lee-Enfield rifles, light machine guns, and rudimentary artillery 
pieces.  There were no aircraft or naval ship-building facilities other than 
at the level of repair and refitting, no research or design facilities for 
armament manufacture.170 
Although having some industry gave it some advantage over China after independence, 
India faced the same lack of resource problem.  The two countries had too much to do to 
catch up and too little to do it with.   
B. NEHRU’S DEVELOPMENT GOALS 
After independence from Britain and the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 
1947, the newly established government of India was dominated by Jawaharlal Nehru 
and his political party, the Indian National Congress (INC).  In comparison to Mao in 
China, Nehru was also a dominant figure in India’s early development. 171  Also like Mao 
and the communists in China, Nehru and the INC had to prioritize development and use 
of resources to build a new country.  Nehru’s goal for India was to build India into a  
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modern state through self-reliance.172  According Reeta Tremblay, he was “… faced with 
the challenging tasks of nation building and economic development … to create an 
egalitarian society in which a ‘quick and progressive rise in the standard of living should 
be the primary consideration governing all economic activities.”173  Nehru’s political will 
was focused on economic development and needs of the people.  The condition of the 
defense industry was least of his priorities.  Consequently, the defense sector saw a 
reduction in budgets under the Nehru administration.174   
1. Influences on Nehru and His Developmental Strategy 
Jawarharlal Nehru’s development policy can be said to have many influences but 
the most important are socialism, historic memory, and Soviet planned development.175  
The socialist influences led to the adoption of five-year economic plans in India which 
were styled after Soviet development strategy.  Whereas the historical memory left a 
number of fears which also influenced Nehru’s polices as the Prime Minister of a post-
colonial state.  First was the global economic downturn during the Great Depression and 
the subsequent drop in global trade.176  Second, was the fear of colonialism.  Nehru 
believed if India could not gain economic independence and become self-reliant, India 
would become an economic colony to other nations again.  Finally, he feared and disliked 
the military, greatly influencing the defense industry development.   
Though the goal was called self-reliance, it was, one may argue, just another 
name for import substitution (ISI).177  The downside of ISI is costs because a nation is 
not tanking advantage of their comparative advantage.  Trying to compete where they do 
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not have a natural edge over other nations increases the cost of production.  In addition, 
with no infrastructure in place to create the goods or an economy of scale, it raises 
production costs.  Wilfred Malenbaum, writing on comparative cost and economic 
development in India, writes that ISI kept new private industry small and inefficient, and 
“…domestic production costs for many import substitutes are at least that much [40 to 50 
percent] above the landed cost of equivalent foreign goods.”178  The political will was to 
create a nation economically independent from other powers, even if in the short term, 
the cost was more.  The drain of financial resources caused by increased prices made 
fewer resources available for the defense industry.   
a. India’s Five Year Plans and the Impact of the Defense Industry 
Central planning and control of major industry requires the government to 
develop a strategy or roadmap for development.  As mentioned before, the blueprints 
Nehru and his government used to attempt and achieve their development goals were 
Soviet style five year plans.  The First Five-Year Plan was to be the foundation upon 
which Nehru’s vision for the nation was to be built.  It showed where Nehru and his 
supporters’ political will lay.  Investment went into building and buying industry from the 
private sector.179  India’s Second and Third Five-Year Plans set out to create the 
industrial core from which all of India’s development would spring.  It closely regulated 
foreign trade and investment.  Following the principle laid out by Nehru, the original 
plans paid little attention to the defense and small industry, consumer goods, or 
agriculture.  According to V. Bhatt, 
Nehru’s strategy was large scale industrialization with emphasis on capital 
and heavy industry.  Cottage industry was to be tolerated with a view to 
provide employment in the short run, but the main objective was to 
develop large-scale modern industries and techniques that would supplant 
the traditional sector.  The dominant sector was to be the modern sector, 
based on modern science and technology.180   
India’s five year plans created major obstacles for the defense industry.  
With the lengthy development time required for advanced weapon planning, the five year 
plans were problematic.  The procurement process from concept, design, and production 
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of advanced weapons is much longer than five years.181  Eventually they adapted to the 
five year plan by rolling the projects through multiple plans, as they did in the case of 
broader industrial development.  In China and the Soviet Union, the five year plans could 
be pushed through with little concern for the masses.  In India, on the other hand, the five 
year plans were subject to reevaluation because of the democratic setting.   
Although these objectives of these plans were grand, the implementation 
of the five year plans met several obstacles. One was of threat to leadership as different 
groups vied to stay or gain power.  Global economic problems also shadowed the five 
year plans.  The impact of these problems highlighted the need for reforms in the 1960s.  
However bad timing and poor implementation “discredited [the reforms], and continued 
reforms were considered politically threatening.”182  In agriculture, however, the reforms 
were successful and created a Green Revolution.  In fact, their success created a setting 
which required more resources to be poured into the agriculture sector further affecting 
the defense budget.   
b. Impact of the Great Depression and Colonialism on Nehru’s 
Policies 
Nehru’s goals were lofty and his influence can be seen in the policies he 
crafted.  The Great Depression and colonialization fears influence Nehru to push for self 
reliance but there was a conflict in his goals.  Though he wanted to achieve economic and 
social equality, shortage of resources and political capital among the elite hampered this 
objective. The economic and industrial development polices had greater political capital 
than social equality because of the make up of the INC.  The elites used their political 
capital to push more resource to industrial development over social equality for their own 
benefit.  Also there was a fear that the lack of industry might make India dependant on 
other nations.  Priority for achieving social equality was overshadowed by the fear of 
colonialism and exploitation by foreign powers.  The defense industry received even 
lesser attention. 
Another objective of self reliance was to prevent dependence upon foreign 
powers.  To prevent dependency, heavy industry was a prerequisite.  Raju Thomas writes,                                                  
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“The 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution, in particular, clearly outlined a policy that was 
fundamentally socialist.  It envisaged progressive state control and ownership of almost 
all major industries in the long run.”183  The strategy was similar to other developing 
countries after World War II, which adopted centralized planning, control of major 
industries, and a focus on heavy industry.  Nehru’s socialist inspired quest for 
industrialization led to the conversion of most defense industries in India to SOEs.184  
Poor funding and oversight of the defense industries later led to inefficiencies which 
could have been resolved by better management and focus on the defense industry, but 
once again that was not Nehru’s priority.  When there was a focus and clear oversight as 
there was with nuclear weapons, the industry did well.  In the rest of the industry, there 
was an indifference that led to inefficiencies and problems.185 
c. Nehru’s Dislike of the Military  
The defense industry and military had a number of factors affecting its 
political capital but the greatest factor I would argue that influenced its ability to garner 
adequate resources was Nehru’s dislike for the sector.  Marwah writes, “There was an 
element of estrangement between the two. In the nationalist perception, the militarily in 
the past had discharged the functions of an ‘army of occupation’ in India.”186  In addition 
to Nehru’s genuine disgust at what that military stood for, a disgust he arguably inherited 
from Mohandas Gandhi, the military’s domination in a coup in Pakistan also heightened 
his insecurities of the military.  These factors all in combination lowered the political 
capital of not only the Indian military but the defense industry over all. According to 
Cohen, 
Believing, too, that the Indian Army had been a tool for the Raj, and thus 
was not to be trusted, Nehru not surprisingly focused most of India’s 
postwar energies on building state power, but not state military power.  He 
took seriously his own statements about the priority of internal economic 
development, so defense budgets remained stagnant.187 
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In addition to Nehru’s genuine dislike for the military and it purpose, he 
and the INC thought defense spending would hurt economic growth.188  Like China 
under Deng, it was economic development first before the defense industry.  The 
leadership in both the countries felt that defense industry would be furthered by the 
development and prosperity of the private sector.  Therefore the defense industry had 
very little political capital to influence political will to obtain resources.  
Though Stephen Cohen writes, “Indian defense planning was virtually 
nonexistent, an afterthought, once the Soviet-inspired five-year plans were 
implemented,”189 it was not totally ignored.  There were some resources invested into the 
defense establishment.  Although low in political capital, Nehru and his government were 
realistic in their perception of the world and knew they would require at least some 
ability to provide for defense.  The capabilities, however, were purchased at the expense 
of developing indigenous capabilities to produce weapons. 
C. DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENSE INDUSTRY UNDER NEHRU  
India’s under funded quest for an indigenous advance arms industry resulted in 
continued failures, eventually convincing leaders that India could not get to where it 
wanted to be without assistance. Prior sections illustrated the lack of political capital for 
the defense sector combined with the shortage of resources undermined the industry. 
However, the failure to hold bureaucracy accountable for effective utilization of the 
resources also undermined the sector.  Inflated expectations also put forth by the 
bureaucracy contributed to the poor development of the industry.  The failures appeared 
to be worse when compared to the original plans and expectations making the military 
weary of the products and promises.  Smith illustrates the problem with inflated 
expectations,  
There appear to have been too many attempts to indigenize the defence 
sector when it is perfectly clear that the expertise and technology are 
unavailable at the national level.  Furthermore, India decision makers have 
always tended to pitch requirements far higher than industry is capable of 
delivering.190 
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Because of failure to create an indigenous advanced arms industry, the decision 
was made to enhance the advanced arms industry by buying technology.191  Buying 
technology was to make incremental gains in the sectors the country was having troubles 
developing and assist in developing an expertise where it was lacking.  But without the 
industrial base, India ended up purchasing weapons significantly rather than building 
them under license.  
The neglect and low political will to spend resources on the defense industry can 
be seen by the minimal progress in all but one defense sector made under Nehru.  The 
one defense sector not neglected by Nehru was the nuclear sector, which was started 
immediately after independence.192  Other than the nuclear industry, there was not much 
development in other sectors of the defense industry beyond small arms and ordinance 
until the middle of the 1950s.193  (Dvir and Tishler’s phase one)  Even when Nehru was 
more inclined towards the development of the industry at the end of the 1950s, progress 
was slow and the industry did not progress much.  Chris Smith’s research into the 
industry found, that it “… actually amounted to very little. … India’s small industrial 
base and the scarcity of resources, including foreign exchange, limited actual productions 
and subsequent progress.”194  Until other factors would change, the defense industry just 
did not have the resources. 
Another factor that harmed the development of the advanced arms industry during 
Nehru’s tenure, in addition to defense planning being an “after thought,” was a lack of a 
link between industry and research.  Research was not used to help modernize existing 
industries and according to Bhatt, “… no appreciation of the role of technology research 
in upgrading traditional techniques, nor … make original research to advance the 
frontiers of science and technological knowledge.”195  It was science for science sake 
only, not the application of science to industrialization to make it better or more efficient.  
As the stated in Chapter 2, “… investment made 10-25 years beforehand predominantly 
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determines military equipment quality.”196  The mistake was critical, not only to the 
defense industry but to the civilian industry as well.  It is not until the Fifth Five Year 
Plan that the problem was finally addressed and technological and scientific research was 
linked to industry development.  The defense industry had little to no advanced 
capabilities in the late 1950s, and there was no research and development linked to 
defense until the Fifth Five Year Plan (1974).  Add 10 to 25 years to the date of the Fifth 
Five Year Plan, and we have an explanation for India’s lack of production capabilities in 
the 1980s and 1990s.   
1. International Security Threats Impact on the Defense Industry 
Threats to India’s national security in the early 1960s shook the Indian civilian 
leaderships’ attitudes towards the defense industry. This external threat which came at 
first from China and then Pakistan, forced the state to divert much needed resources into 
the defense sector.  As the threat perception caused by the China war increased and 
nuclear proliferation increased, so did the defense industries’ political capital.  Up until 
then, India used to purchase weapons systems from developed nations.  Cohen states,  
It took growing tensions with China and the 1958 coup in Pakistan to 
persuade the government to reconsider its overall security policy … There 
was a new emphasis on indigenous production and licensing, rather than 
the purchase of complete systems from foreign suppliers.197   
Without the basic infrastructure in place, it takes a while to increase indigenous 
production.  Therefore, purchasing of weapon systems continued. In fact, as the threat 
increased, so did the political will to spend more on indigenous production.  Meanwhile, 
the immediate conditions led to the purchase of weapons for immediate needs reducing 
the resources for indigenous development.  After India was defeated by China and 
Nehru’s popularity saw a decline, the political capital of the defense industry 
skyrocketed. Yet, as a poor nation, India could not develop weapons and at the same time 
purchase them.  
a. A War with China Gives a Boost to the Arms Industry 
The concern over the loss to China was reflected by the fact that the 
defense budget nearly doubled the year after the war. (See Figure 1.)  According to 
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Marwah, “The earlier leisurely pace of development an armament industry was speeded 
up and its requirements formalized as high priority items within the general context of 
planned development.”198  Without the ability to produce weapons to meet the immediate 
threat India started to purchase weapons to modernize the military at an increasing rate.  
The wholesale purchase of weapons pulled resources from indigenous research and 
development and production.  “In the immediate aftermath of the war, India had appeared 
to abandon selectivity in the sources of its weapons supplies.  Equipment came, in short 
term, from sources as contradictory as the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, West 
Germany, Canada, and Yugoslavia.”199  
 
Figure 1.   India’s Defense Spending 1950 to 1970  
 
2. Development of Nuclear Weapons Under  
As mentioned earlier, nuclear research was the only sector of the defense industry 
that had sufficient political capital before the war with China.  Whereas, the indigenous 
fighter industry was virtually nonexistent.  The primary reason for the nuclear industries 
early success was Homi Bhabha, who was close to Nehru.  According to Smith, 
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Homi Bhabha, a brilliant scientist and the father of India’s nuclear 
programme, used both his political power base, which stemmed from his 
pre-eminent position within the scientific bureaucracy during the 1960s, 
and his personal relationship with Nehru to advance the nuclear power 
programme and keep open the option to produce nuclear weapons.200 
Second reason was the dual capability of nuclear research.  While Nehru was 
against the military, the use of force, and nuclear weapons he did approve of the use of 
nuclear research for civilian purposes.  Following the war with China, Nehru started to 
see that it might be advantageous to have the weapon as a defensive deterrence further 
enhancing the political capital for nuclear research.201  Finally, nuclear capability could 
bring India prestige in the international community.   
D. PROGRESS OF THE ADVANCED ARMS INDUSTRY AFTER THE 
DEATH OF NEHRU 
After Nehru’s death in 1964, it seemed like the defense industry would finally get 
the support it needed to develop thanks to change of leadership as well as increased threat 
perception.  The increase in political will to fund the defense industry did happen but it 
was short lived.  Cohen writes, “Although defense was a high priority for a time (1962-
73), surpassing even development programs, Indians remain skeptical – or at least 
divided – about the virtues of military power.”202  The reasons for the defense industries 
drop in political capital were numerous: impending famine, democratic demand, 
economic downturns, sanctions, and the Soviets.   
1. Influences of Democracy on the Arms Industry 
Early in the post-war period, it was Nehru, the INC, and the elite priorities that 
shaped the political will.  With India’s independence came great expectations, not only 
from the elite but from the masses as well.  The expectations shaped the use of resources 
in the country.  Since poor peasants made up 80 percent of the population, logic would 
dictate that in a democracy they would have a greater voice.203  Initially, the majority of 
the population did not have a greater voice because elites controlled the INC and pushed 
back on Nehru’s social reforms.  As India and its democracy grew, however, the poor                                                  
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masses began to mobilize for various reasons to use their power to vote.  The 
mobilization shifted the power from the elite to the masses as a democracy intends.   
Not unique to India, the need of political groups to pander to the masses and elites 
for votes influences the government’s objectives.  What may be good for long term 
development of a democratic third world nation may not have popular or elite support.  In 
other words, it may not have the political capital needed for implementation.  In India, the 
leaders in power “… lacked the political will to resolve the problems of poverty and 
socioeconomic structural imbalance … [they are] committed to doing as much as it can to 
resolve the poverty problem but without rocking the boat.”204  The fear of “rocking the 
boat” affected India’s ability to develop an advanced defense industry.   
a. Impact of Green Revolution on Resource Management 
As a result of having to purchase food from the United States to avert a 
famine in the mid 1960s, the Indian government instituted a new policy to increase food 
production.  The government poured money into the countryside to help the small 
farmers produce better crops.  They received free seed, fertilizer, and subsidies which led 
to increased food production.  The success of this program created a class of small 
prosperous farmers which demanded political representation and began to assert 
themselves at the national level.205  With economic advancement comes social 
advancement because money facilitates education and mobilization.  According to 
Thomas Simons, 
As more and more people and groups enter ‘the system,’ they develop 
stakes in the system.  They awaken to new hopes of gaining, to new fears 
of losing.  They have new means-technical and conceptual as well as 
economic-to mobilize for action to advance those hopes and/or to allay 
those fears.206 
The farmers rising political power influenced the state to shift its resources 
to gain the support of the lower classes. Meanwhile, the indigenous defense industry, 
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barring the nuclear program, however, saw a decline in its resources as the state changed 
its focus to accommodate political change in the country.  Thomas is his review of India’s 
defense budgets found,  
… after an initial high of 4.5% in the post-China war budget of 1963, … 
the overall allocation to the Ministry of Defence has been lowered to about 
3% of the GNP since 1973, there has also been a relatively budgetary 
decline in the share of all three Services.  Defense problems in the mid 
1070s appeared to command much less public attention than domestic 
political issues.207  
The shift was also reflected in the leadership which was initially 
dominated by the upper classes/caste, but in rich agriculture areas were gradually 
replaced by the lower classes/castes.208  The shift caused urban professionals, small 
businesses, and urban areas to become marginalized due to loss of political influence.  
The shift and marginalization of different classes caused fragmentation of the INC and 
gave rise to other smaller parties.  Fragmentation helped Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to 
come to power which till then had been limited to the northern region of the country.209  
The increase farmer strength at the local levels led to fragmented vote banks in different 
regions.  “India’s elections increasingly revolve around local or regional concerns and 
power dynamics between social groups.”210  Where no parties are strong enough to gain 
outright control, lead to the formation of coalition governments in India.211  For national 
parties such as INC or BJP to form a government, they need to partner with smaller 
parties in coalition to gain a majority. 212    
Coalition building creates an even greater need to please different 
demographics for votes.  In fact, it overemphasizes minority or small groups because 
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larger parties try to gain favor with them to acquire a majority.  Coalitions allow groups 
to consolidate political capital to gain resources for their causes.  Forming coalitions and 
trying to please voters squeezed resources and pulled it from all but the nuclear program 
in the defense industry.  Other sectors did not have the political capital the farmers had, 
especially the defense sector which only gets political capital at the time of threat. 
Pandering is illustrated by the INC’s attempt to cut farm subsidies.  As the farmer’s 
numbers and influence grew so did farm subsidies to the point where they were at 
“astronomical levels.”213  The farmers have so much political capital that trying to reign 
in farm subsides was political suicide for an Indian politician or political party.  When 
India faced a fiscal crisis in the 1980s, the government tried to cut subsidies creating a 
political fire storm which threatened to topple the government.  The poor and the 
farmers’ uproar caused politicians to reverse their decision on cutting subsidies.  
Demonstrating how truly democratic India is, the people voted out the INC that 
implemented the short lived subsidy cuts.   With a coalition government, the opposition 
BJP was able to take power the 1998 election.  
2. Dependency on the Soviet Union 
Even when there is an external threat that increases the political capital of the 
defense industry it cannot instantly succeed over night. When a threat does exist, the 
indigenous arms industry cannot produce or supply weapons the military needs 
immediately.  The lack of capability leads to purchasing or licensing of weapons that take 
resources from indigenous development.  Amit Gupta writing about India’s arms industry 
states,   
The Indian government decided to turn to the Soviet Union for arms 
supplies in 1962, through the purchase of MiG-21s, because it wanted to 
acquire the necessary technology to produce such system. … Since the 
signing of the MiG deal in 1962, the Soviet Union has become India’s 
principal supplier of weaponry.214 
The Soviets took a dramatic step to bind India to them for decades to come by 
granting licenses to build Soviet weapons systems and deceptive low prices.  Licensing 
was common among Western allies, but not common for the Soviet Union.  In fact, at the 
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time India was the only country outside the Soviet Union that was allowed to produce 
major advanced Soviet weapons systems under license.215  The Soviet Union offered a 
multitude of weapons systems for all branches of India’s armed forces.  India used Soviet 
systems as a core upon which to build its troubled industry creating a dependency that 
hurt India in the long run.  According to Ramesh Thakur, the dependency was created 
because advanced Soviet weapon systems “enjoyed significant price advantages over 
comparable Western equipment … [and unlike western technology] had a tendency to 
cumulate development, so that license production facilities could be upgraded to 
manufacture systems that were compatible with earlier generations.”216 
From the 1960s to the early 1980s India was dependent on the Soviet Union for 
direct purchases and license production (phase two) to meet its military needs and help its 
indigenous arms production.217  According to Gupta, by the early 1970s “close to 40% of 
the [Indian] Air Force’s inventory consisted of Soviet aircraft”218 and by 1995 the 
continued dependency resulted in “approximately 70% of India’s defense equipment is of 
Soviet origin.”219   The dependency derived from the on and off relationship with the 
United States but more importantly the favorable financing offered by the Soviet 
Union.220  Because Nehru and the INC had not invested in indigenous production they 
had to purchase when the threat increased.  Once again purchasing pulled money away 
from the defense industrial development. The lack of development snow balled.  Deba 
Mohanty writes, the dependency “… caused a gap of nearly three decades in India’s 
effort toward indigenous production.”221 As the security needs increased, they had to 
purchase more and pull more away from indigenous development.   
The politicians and bureaucracy allowed India to became too dependant on what 
was initially perceived as cheap purchase of weapons systems over development of their 
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own indigenous industry.  The dependency increased because the initial low cost for 
Soviet weapons did not include the high cost of maintaining the equipment, pulling even 
more resources from indigenous development.222  The choice to develop an advanced 
arms industry was not as strong as the political will to trade with the Soviet Union for 
cheep imports, kickbacks, and an export market for India’s agriculture products.  Smith 
writes,  
On the one hand there was a growing awareness of and concern about 
dependency. … On the other hand, New Delhi had nowhere else to go for 
defence equipment during a time when the mounting bill for food grains, 
fertilizers, oil and steel had virtually wiped out the country’s foreign 
exchange reserves.223 
Another reason the industry continued down the road of substandard performance 
is because there is no political will to fix the problems of the industry.  For some of 
India’s politicians it was in their best interest to keep the ineffective status quo because of 
kickbacks they received for themselves and their political party.224  Corruption 
allegations and the fact that kickbacks influence defense acquisition is common 
knowledge.225   
The bureaucratic pull towards continued purchasing and licensing of products 
contributed to the failure of the development of indigenous advanced arms industry.  
However given the security context and the lack of indigenous production capabilities the 
original decision to purchase and license weapons is understandable.  However, cheap 
weapons decreased the desire to develop a domestic weapons capability. 226  Even when 
it became clear it was detrimental to their ultimate goal of self sufficiency (phase four), 
the government, Ministry of Defense, and the military continued down the road of 
dependence staying in phases two and three of development.  Mohanty writes, the 
dependence on the Soviet Union “… unavoidably led to two problems – below par 
quality performance of the defence industry … and insufficient funding for the critical 
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sectors of the defence industry including most notably its R&D effort.”227  Buying or 
licensing from predominantly Soviet Union and at times from the British and French 
created an easier route to get advanced weapons.  Bureaucratic short sightedness and the 
choice to seek routes that achieve instant gratification, ignoring or not consider the 
consequences of such decisions, hurt the development of a domestic arms industry in 
India.   
3. Break Up of Soviet Union and its Effects on the Indian Arms Industry  
Just before the fall of the Soviet Union, 1980-1990s, India faces its second major 
economic crisis as its currency fell against other nations’ currencies.  Vijay Kelkar states, 
“By 1991-92 the outstanding liabilities of the central government exceeded 69 percent of 
GDP.  The interest payments on the public debt represented nearly 70 percent of the 
center’s fiscal deficit.”228   At the same time, developed nation’s weapons became more 
technologically advanced and expensive.229  When India was least able to afford 
weapons, the price of advanced arms skyrocketed.  Soviet Union was willing to make 
deals for equipment that did not require payments in hard currency.  India and the Soviet 
Union had a Rupee trade agreement that did not require hard currency.230 When Soviet 
Union collapsed it further compounded India’s financial and arms development crisis.   
First, the dependency, a mentioned before, hindered the development of India’s 
arms industry and was therefore unable to fill the void.   Second, the fall of the Soviet 
Union cut off their supply of weapons.  Since the Soviets spread production of weapons 
throughout the Union, which were now separate countries, India had to track down who 
supplied what weapons or parts to a system.  To make matters worse, the new cash 
strapped Republics that used to make up the Soviet Union wanted hard currency.  
Currency India did not have because of the economic crisis.  India had to renegotiate with 
the individual republics that now owned the different weapons sectors.  As a result, India 
started to discuss privatizing their arms industry. 
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4. Private Industry and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
India’s state-owned defense industry is facing the same problems as other nation’s 
defense industries.231  Like China, India’s private sector fears involvement in the state-
owned defense sector because they see it as to risky and expensive.  According to Jane’s, 
India’s civilian industry is also “… wary of dealing with an ‘unbending and bureaucratic’ 
MoD, [they are] also circumspect about insufficient orders which would make any 
participation commercially untenable since big financial outlays were required for 
defence R&D and production.”232  By remaining state owned, the industry is not forced 
to show short run results like the private sector.  In fact, Indian acquisition officials 
confess they are “clueless” in commercial acquisitions.233  The government run defense 
industry is so out of touch with the realities of the civilian industry it has been described 
by James Clad as working “within a closed circle, twirling on its own axis and indifferent 
to the rest of the economy.”234  In 2001, realizing India’s private sector is not able or 
willing to help the beleaguered state-owned defense industry, India changed its policy to 
allow more direct foreign investment, up to 26 percent, of its defense industry.235  
5. Bureaucracy 
The Indian bureaucracy adds to the drain on the limited resources allocated for the 
advanced arms industry.  The Indian bureaucracy uses these resources ineffectively and 
direct too little to research and development.  The Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Defense supports the assertion.  Similar to the problems facing China, they have found 
the defense industry spreads the research and development funds over too many project, 
resulting in a poor end product.236  For example, the organization will fund pet projects 
that will get voter or political support, of which only nuclear program has seen success.  
The committee states that the failure to “… adequately focus on vital costs and scope … 
caused numerous changes in the programs’ General Staff Qualitative Requirement 
(GSQR) leading to delays and import of expensive components which drained scarce 
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foreign exchange reserves.”237  Also, “don’t rock the boat” mentality makes reform of the 
system difficult because of the risk of losing office.  These delays not only cause a drain 
on resources, but support the military’s complaints about delivery of Indian weapons.  
India’s military’s confidence in her advanced arms industry is low.  They say it has 
produced “little [of] worth since its inception in 1958.”238  
Defense Research and Development Organization officials, in turn, accuse the 
military of imperiling projects by making “unrealistic” demands and requirements that 
change constantly.”239  Both are correct.  The Defense Research and Development 
Organization failed in its oversight of development projects.  The military failed to give 
clear well thought out requirements and continues to make changes to project after they 
have started.  It is just in 2004 that the Ministry of Defense finally implemented new 
clearer guidelines.  India’s military continues to hesitate in dealing with India’s arms 
industry because of their poor record of delivery.  The bureaucratic bumbling and lack of 
oversight of India’s acquisition and procurement is summed up best by Unnithan.  He 
states,  
The process of buying arms is so opaque and beset by delays-it has been 
described as the fiercest enemy of the armed forces itself.  They say these 
delays caused far greater concern than kickbacks because they severely 
affect defence preparedness and the ongoing modernization drive … ‘Our 
procedures are so convoluted.  If they are dutifully followed, nothing can 
be procured within any time frame,’ says a senior defense official.  ‘It 
takes one year to get a simple yes from the government.  By then it is time 
to surrender our budgetary allocation to the Finance Ministry because we 
haven’t bought the weapon system.240  
The disjointed acquisition process is exemplified by a 2000 purchase made by all 
three services.  The Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force bought the same UAV from the 
same Israeli company and each paid a different price. Yet, there is no plan to fix the 
problems for reasons outlined above.   
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E. DEVELOPMENT OF FIGHTERS IN POST NEHRU PERIOD 
The indigenous fighter industry has never been a pressing priority for the 
politicians or military in India. In 2005, the Former Commander in Chief of the Indian 
Air Force Training Command, Air Marshal Pandey, said “… the Indian aerospace 
industry does not as yet have the technological strength to meet this requirement on its 
own, the nation has no option but to turn to the international market.”241  In addition to 
the lack of support from political leaders, the military also does not have the political will 
to support the indigenous fighter industry. The armed forces prefer foreign fighters, 
especially western systems, to those developed indigenously.242 
The attempts to build a fully indigenous fighter has been a continuous failure.  
The first attempt to build an indigenous fighter, the HF-24 Marut, was in the late 1960s 
and it failed.243  It came at a time when the increased security threat provided the industry 
with some resources, yet, it failed because India tried to develop it before it had the 
technical capabilities.  Thomas Graham writes, “Marut relied on imported parts and 
materials and was more expensive to produce in India than it would have been to import a 
complete plane.  The plane was technically obsolete by the time it was first delivered in 
1964.”244 
Without the capability to produce their own fighters, India is successfully 
licensing production of foreign weapons (phase two).  They are also successful at 
upgrading licensed weapons (phase three).  However, the licensing hurts indigenous 
fighter production and the industry as a whole because it drains limited resources.  
Smith’s investigation into India’s arms industry reveals, “Indigenous production of the 
MiG-21 series was an expensive venture for India.  The cost of producing the MiG-21 in 
India was 193 percent more than its imported cost.”245  Outright purchasing would have 
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been cheaper than building licensed weapons.  However, purchasing would not have 
given the experience of building weapons which created a catch 22. 
The latest venture of the development of an indigenous fighter is the Light 
Combat Aircraft (LCA).  Though under development since 1983, it is still not operational 
and its projected service date is continuously postponed. The current projection for the 
LCA to go into service is 2010.246  Even after 24 years of development, India will still 
require foreign help with the engines.247 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter evaluated the reasons behind the slow development of India’s 
indigenous advanced arms industry as a whole.  Only certain small sectors have seen 
success.  Smith writes, “Many of the claims that systems are ‘indigenous’ are in fact 
misrepresentations, as increasingly the term is used to cover production which involves 
little more than assembly.”248  The creation of a wholly indigenous advanced arms 
industry in India failed for a number of reasons.  I contend it is now too costly for nations 
to develop advanced weapons alone and it is too late for nations not already possessing a 
fully indigenous advanced arms industry to build one.   
India is clearly not making the most of what it has because it possesses the 
technicians, scientist, and infrastructure to develop technologies to make India’s 
advanced arms industry more self sufficient than it is.  India’s “efforts have been dogged 
by delays, price increases and bureaucratic-political wrangling far beyond what has come 
to be expected as normal.”249  One reason for the failures is “the constraints of 
democratic politics”250 shaping the allocation of resources in the early phases of 
development.  Political parties and their leaders focused on policies to get votes from the 
masses. Defense only received increased resources if it was framed into a political issue 
as nuclear program was.   
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Second, India has partnered with countries that will share technologies they need 
through licensing.  Licensing creates a dependency that drains the will and resources to 
build an indigenous advanced arms industry and has frozen them into phase two and three 
of defense development.  Instead of using licensing as a means to increase their 
indigenous capability they have allowed it to overshadow indigenous production. 
However, it does not have a choice in order to keep up its advanced arms supplies which 
brings me to my point about how it will be difficult for developing nations to spend 
resources on both development of advanced resources as well as purchase. Third, 
indigenous production is hurt because India’s research and development is under funded. 
There is a lack of political will to prioritize the research and development.  They spread 
money over too many projects and have a dysfunctional procurement process.   
The political will of India’s leaders in the first 50 years of its existence was not 
the development of an indigenous advanced arms industry but economic development.  
Where there were external sources available, India took the path that made them over 
dependant on those outside sources to the detriment of its indigenous sources.  Gupta 
states, “In situations were the pressure to attain self-sufficiency has been high, the Indian 
scientific establishment has been able to deliver the goods.”251  India is now entering a 
new phase of industrial arms development, a phase of joint development.  India, unlike 
China, may have finally gotten it right.  Joint development, unlike licensing, should 
actually help develop India’s advance arms industry by developing its infrastructure and 
technicians while not taking money from research and development.  In fact joint 
development should put money into India’s research and development.  Joint 
development if managed properly will pay off big for India and further its goal of 
becoming a regional power on the Indian Asia.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
Using China and India as case studies, my thesis investigates the feasibility of 
developing nations’ ability to create a wholly indigenous advanced arms industry. No 
developing nations including China and India, have a fully domestic advanced arms 
industry.  Given current strategies, countries that try to develop the entire industry will 
have extreme difficulty.  Both authoritarian and democratic countries have constituents 
that must be appeased to remain in power.  Scarce resources are spread thin in the nation 
building process leaving an inadequate amount to fully develop the defense industry.  By 
concentrating resources there are, however, a number of developing nations who have 
successfully developed specific sectors of their defense industry.  More specifically, 
strategic weapon sectors such as nuclear weapons and missiles are chosen for resource 
allocations because they bring international prestige and deterrence as well as have 
civilian applicability.   
The development of a fully indigenous arms industry is not a realistic option for a 
developing nation given the circumstances.  The current context of the globalized arms 
industry and the prohibitive costs of building advanced weapons are causing developed 
nations to rethink their strategy for building and acquiring advanced weapons.  Bharat 
Verma supports my assertion when he writes,  
No single vendor or country has the resources to invest individually to attain self-
sufficiency in creating weapon platforms of the next generation.  The future well 
being of nations will depend on their integrating their armament industries 
effectively between countries with shared perceptions of their national interests by 
creating joint ventures.252 
More and more nations, developed or undeveloped, are moving towards joint 
development.   
Few nations now have the capability to develop and build advanced systems 
alone.  To have modern military capabilities, less developed nations have a choice to 
continue to strive for self sufficiency, buy weapons, licensing production of weapons, or 
pursue joint development of weapon systems.  Self sufficiency will most likely fail and 
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waste resources which are limited for developing nations.  Buying and licensing does not 
lead to significant technology transfer and creates dependency.  Dependency allows other 
nations to have undue influence over one’s internal affairs.253  Joint development may still 
allow undue influence but at a lesser level because it produces a codependency.  In his 
research, Richard Bitzinger shows joint development is on the rise.  He says, “While the 
licensed production of Western or Russian weapons remains the major mode of arms 
manufacturing in these countries [developing nations], codevelopment and coproduction 
programs between developing and industrialized nations are gradually increasing.”254 
(See Figure 2.) 
 
 
Figure 2.   Licensed and Joint Development (Codevelopment) 1961-1995  
 
My theory has important implications for the United States foreign policy 
formation.  Although both India and China continue to build Russian aircraft, the fact that 
China must still fly them back to Russia for major repairs is a sign of weakness that may 
be exploited.  The United States needs to know where India and China fall on the 
                                                 
253  Theodore H. Moran, “The Globalization of America's Defense Industries: Managing the Threat of 
Foreign Dependence,” International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 57-99. 
254 Bitzinger, “Challenge,” 186. 
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dependence scale.  Knowing the amount of influence the United States may bring to bear, 
directly or indirectly, upon China and India will allow Washington to influence the two 
nations to conform to United States’ overall policy objectives.  Both China and India 
realize dependency is a problem and have faced it in the past, the Chinese with the 
Soviets and the Indians with the United States.  However neither chooses to commit the 
resources to develop their advanced arms industry at the expense of the economic 
development and political pressure.  Also detrimental to their indigenous development of 
an arms industry is the fact that both China and India continue to be the largest importers 
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